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The change from platform to network centric warfare requires new perspectives
of the Defense Industrial Base. Both the 1996 Defense Science Board Report on Vertical
Integration and DoD's 1999 report on Price Based Acquisition recommend that DoD take
steps to further understanding of competitive conditions in the defense industry. This
thesis explores one method for gaining this insight. The industry is producing the system
of systems for DoD, not just platforms. This thesis studies prime contractors for 78
programs which have been determined as the foundation for the future system of systems.
By applying the Value-Net business model, it reviews the influences the Department of
Defense, International Governments and industries, commercial firms, and suppliers have
upon the prime contractors. This analysis identifies growth markets in interoperability
development and open system component development. It also identifies competition-
induced constraints on weapon system production markets. Through a survey of Defense
Contract Management Agency Prime Integrators, it determines the concentration of
prime contractor performance in the 78 programs. Based on data from 61 of the 92 prime
contracts, it also reveals performance trends , indicating that key players in the industry
have established strategies for network centric development. This thesis also shows that
using the Value-Net business model is a valid method for understanding competitive
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In May 1997, the Defense Science Board Task Force reported on Vertical
Integration and Supplier Decisions. The study looked at industries that produced
integrated defense systems such as tanks, aircraft, ships, satellites and the subsystems and
components needed to build them. [Ref. 36 p. vi] One of the five recommendations made
by the Board called for the establishment of measures to "help DoD managers recognize
areas of potential vertical integration concern and trigger more detailed investigation."
[Ref. 36 p. xv] This recommendation was qualified by a caution that the diversity of the
technology and platforms make a universal measure of integration impossible and
undesirable. Statements made by Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission, in July of that same year also voiced concern that the focus of competition
analysis is at the system level. "The Commission may need to look at a number of
potential markets in any one merger. For instance, if both merging firms make missiles,
aircraft, and submarines, the Commission would look at all three of those weapons
systems to see if they qualify as relevant product markets." [Ref. 75 p.3] The Department
of Defense and the Federal Trade Commission's focus on platform producers is aimed at
an extremely important segment of the industry. Recent changes in the Department of
Defense, however, require a view of the industry from a higher level.
The Department of Defense formalized initiatives during the 1990's that have a
profound effect on Mr. Pitofsky's statement. Just a few months before the Defense
Science Board published its report, and Mr. Pitofsky made his statements, Joint Vision
2010 was published. This vision has developed into the concepts of network-centric
warfare and a defense system of systems. These concepts place the value of the system at
its ability to integrate within the battlespace. Through JV2010, network-centric warfare,
sensor-to-shooter concepts and now time-critical targeting, the Department of Defense
has been shaping its vision of future integrated warfare systems. The Joint Staff best
summarizes the defense industry's message to industry when it explains how JV 2020
supports the four operational concepts employed by the armed forces.
The new document focuses on three factors as central to success in these
four operational concepts and the resulting capability of full-spectrum
dominance:
Interoperability: Success across the full range of military operations
requires interoperability among the joint force, multinational partners, and
the interagency.
Innovation: Broad-based innovation is the key to transforming the
capabilities of the joint force.
Decision Superiority: Information superiority will enable joint command
and control to be transformed so our commanders can make better and
faster decisions than their opponents. [Ref. 69]
The Department of Defense is publicizing that desired future systems will operate
in the synergistic overlaps between Detection, Communication, and Execution. This
thesis uses the conceptual model from Lifting the Fog ofWar by Admiral William Owens
(US Navy, Retired) to demonstrate the emerging operational domain. [Ref. 79 p. 99]
Because of this emergence, the relevant market for firms is the DoD's integrated system












While military doctrine proposed network power and system compatibility, the
Acquisition and Science and Technology initiatives promoted single system and
component optimization over systems integration. In the early 1990's, the Department of
Defense was coming to grips with its reduced budget. While Federal resources applied to
research and development were shrinking, civilian expenditures in this area were
growing. In the face of these reduced R&D resources, the Department of Defense moved
to optimize individual platform and component performance by leveraging ongoing
commercial R&D efforts. The Department of Defense took measures to instigate spin off
and spin on initiatives. Acting on the recommendations of the Carnegie Commission, The
Department of Defense dropped the term "Defense" from DARPA and refocused its
emphasis on dual use as well as defense unique technology. [Ref. 84 p. 17] In 1993, the
Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) was unveiled. Additionally, In June of 1994,
then Defense Secretary William Perry signed his directive abolishing military
specifications without special approval. Acting on the recommendations from the
process action team for acquisition reform, he set a course to promote systems design and
development based on commercial standards and performance specifications. These
initiatives placed the onus on Defense Industry to balance the infusion of technology with
the optimization of the systems of systems. Since the money was aimed at platform
optimization, and network warfare was still a concept, system of systems integration did
not receive proper industry attention. This method of acquisition, however, produced
exceptional platforms that can provide tremendous sensor information to the commander
and eventually to the engaged weapon system. The growth of capability resulted in an
explosion of communication pathways. As an example, the following two figures
demonstrate the communication networks available to a Naval asset during the Gulf War
and Today. [Ref. 40]
Because of the focus of this analysis, the titles and individual transmission speeds
of the systems listed in these figures are irrelevant. The relevance of these diagrams is in
the sheer volume of communication systems and overall data rate used in Naval
operations. These figures show how the naval commander can turn to multiple systems to
gather independently developed pieces of the battlespace picture. The systems were not
designed to synthesize their products, and therefore, do not produce a single
commanders' picture without considerable data manipulation. Nonetheless, the
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Figure 3 Communications in FY 2000 From [Ref. 40]
dependence. This growth of interdependence gave credence and empirical validation of
the networked warfare concepts.
The Department of Defense's shaping of the industry through commercial and
interoperability requirements has additionally created global consequences. The
globalization of the technology base is having a tremendous impact on weapon system
development. In 1997, the National Defense Panel described the technology base for
future defense systems as increasingly global and commercial. [Ref. 37 p. 74] The
defense industry firms must compete at a global level because the technology market
crosses national borders. Benjamin W. Heinman, Jr., Vice President General Electric
Company, in his 1995 testimony on the global an innovation based competition stated,
"The markets in which new technologies are developed and in which products are sold
are international rather than national in scope. ... In sum, it is obvious to those of us
engaged in the day-to-day global competition that the winners in the world marketplace
will be firms and nations that create the lowest cost, highest values products in the
quickest, most efficient manner." [Ref. 29] As defense systems become increasingly
dependent on technology and innovation, the global influences will have a greater impact
on the Defense Industry. Additionally, events in Kosovo showed that the interoperability
requirements are no longer restricted to US forces. Future warfare is expected to to be
predominantly coalition warfare. In his June 1999 speech to seventeenth NATO
workshop, Dr. Jacques S. Gansler stressed that interoperability will be the requirement
for all future conflicts. He also defined how interoperability would be maintained.
That said, technology ~ when proper coalition planning and
implementation are achieved ~ enables us to act effectively - in fact,
synergistically — to achieve the objectives we seek. But it does require that
each partner keep up with the technological evolutions; an admittedly
difficult and an expensive effort - including both the investment in new
military equipment and in the training for its use, as well as the continued
investment in research and development in order to stay ahead. [Ref. 42]
The integration initiatives of the late 1990's have given the networked warfare
concept an increased importance and therefore raised the importance of complementing
and interoperable systems. The Secretary of the Navy and the Defense Undersecretary for
Acquisition Technology and Logistics have both established Interoperability Directorates.
In 1999, Dr. Gansler and General Joseph W. Ralston established system interoperability
as a key performance parameter in all future Operational Requirements Documents. "To
accomplish this goal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already completed a rewrite of the
Chairman's "3170 Series" to reflect flexible and time-phased requirements,
interoperability as a key performance parameter, the use of capstone requirements
documents for mission areas, and affordability in requirements documents." [Ref. 43 P.
14] Additionally, the 2001 Defense Authorization bills, H.R. 4205 and S. 2550, both
include section 906 which is titled Network Centric Warfare. This section directs the
Department of Defense to study and report on network centric warfare. The report due in
October 2001 shall make recommendations for the acquisition, development, and
execution of network centric warfare. This language is accompanied by line item in the
conference report 106-644 that allots $9 Million "to develop the Naval Fires Network
Demonstrator, test the tactical dissemination of intelligence for Time Critical Strike
Capabilities on-board the E 2C, and refine the NCW concept of operations". [Ref. 86 p.
167]
Recent alliances and changes in the industry suggest that the large defense firms
may be making strategic moves to capitalize on the Department of Defense
interoperability initiatives. Lockheed Martin has announced a business alliance with
Cisco Systems as a means of enhancing their networking capability for systems such as
DD-21 and the US Air Force's Integrated Space Command and Control (ISC2)
requirement. [Ref. 76] They have additionally announced development of the JSF high-
fidelity sensor integration facility outside the Dallas Fort-Worth airport. [Ref. 77] The
competitive strategy of firms integrating the sensor to shooter systems may be the
common denominator of the diverse market environments described by the Defense
Science Board and Mr. Pitofsky. If the members of the industry are building their
corporate strategy around providing sensor to shooter or networked systems, they would
compete for a platform or capability based on its relevance to the larger system of
systems and their position in the industry.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is an analysis of the Government/industry relationship
that will produce the weapon systems of network centric warfare. It will examine the
incentives of Government policy, market forces, and structure. The focus is on the
influence of structure as a means of promoting or inhibiting competition, efficiency, and
innovation. Subsidiary research questions include:
1. What is the competitive environment for prime integrators developing a
defense system of systems?
2. How does the globalization of technology industries affect the competitive
environment?
3. How do Government forces shape industry structure, FTC regulation, and
DOD incentives?
4. What is the market structure in terms of maturity, differentiation or
economies of scale opportunities, and exit and entry costs?
5. Given the above industry shaping forces, what economic principles and
models may be used to predict industry activity?
6. Given the predictions, are there recommendations for Government action
that may influence industry structure?
C. SCOPE
This thesis examines the 78 acquisition programs for platforms and systems that
equate to the Department of Defense's near term networked warfare capability. The
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This thesis examines the prime integration contractors of these programs. The
analysis plots the contractor participation in terms of presence, percentage of revenue,
and value added based on the vision of the networked system of systems. The data is
collected from government contracts databases, contract administration facilities the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), and recent internal financial and
strategic planning as determinable by stockholder reports, public affairs announcements,
and security exchange commission required reports. The research explores and describes
the range of influences on these firms through an analysis of Government trends and
domestic and global competition activity in the defense and commercial sector.
D. METHODOLOGY
This thesis uses Admiral Owens' model of warfare to define industry involvement
in the development of the missions listed above. The research performs a value analysis
of the external influences on the defined industry. This analysis is based on a Value-Net
model developed by Harvard Business School and Yale School of Management
economists Adam Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff. [Ref. 8 ] This model applies the
principles of game theory to the well-accepted Porter model of competitive forces. It
provides a useful structure with which to analyze the desired value, complements and
competition in a contract relationship. In building the model, this thesis first defines the
external influences through literary research of Government technical reports and
congressional documents focused on the attributes of network-centric warfare, time
critical-targeting, open systems architecture, and interoperability requirements. It then
analyzes the forces internal to the industry by researching the concentration of value
added networked warfare production capabilities of the prime contractors for the 78
programs. This research focuses on the complementary attributes created by the
industry's most recent structure and the networked warfare concept requirements. The
research then applies industrial organization principles to the established structure.
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E. THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter II has two objectives. First it defines Network-Centric warfare and its critical
acquisition requirements. Building on the definition, it applies Admiral Owens' theories
to the Department of Defense's recent initiatives and validates the programs selected for
this thesis. Second it describes the merits of the Value-Net paradigm and how its features
suit this analysis. It explains how the oligopolistic attributes of the Defense industry are
defined by game theoretic principles. Then it shows how the understanding of
complementary and competitive forces is a crucial element of understanding the
associated strategic interaction that occurs. The third chapter defines the
Government/Industry Value-Net. It describes the characteristics of each node in the Net
and its possible interaction with the rest. The fourth chapter analyzes the relationships
defined in chapter three with industrial organization and economic analysis. The final
chapter draws general principles that may be applied to the defense industry in terms of
the Revolution of Military Affairs and Network-Centric Warfare.
11
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II. METHODOLOGIES
A. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
1. Introduction
The Revolution of Military Affair's vision of smaller, swifter forces relying on
information superiority for success is certainly different from the massing of forces
doctrine proposed by Carl Von Clausewitz and perfected by the war experiences since
Napoleon's Levee en Masse. It is different, but not contradictory. Both Clausewitz and
Sun Tzu professed that awareness of the battle environment and one's own capabilities
were crucial to a commander's success. Clausewitz called all the interdependent aspects
of the battlespace friction and stated that "a good general must know friction in order to
overcome it whenever possible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in
his operations which this friction makes impossible." [Ref. 17 p. 120] Sun Tzu
summarized the use of information into "Know the enemy and yourself; in a hundred
battles you will never be in peril" [Ref. 98 p. 83] Both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu believed
that although battlespace awareness was crucial to successful operations, the assessment
and communication technology of the time made accurate and timely information
impossible. Sun Tzu suggested deception as a way to use poor information to your
advantage; Clausewitz advocated the use of overwhelming force to overcome the effects
of poor information. Existing sensor and communication technology makes network
centric warfare possible. Assessment and communication systems of the near future
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promise to be sufficiently reliable, swift, and accurate enough to negate friction, penetrate
the fog of war, and discern the true objectives of a deceptive enemy.
Dr. David Alberts and Mr. John Garstka through the C4ISR Cooperative Research
Program (CCRP) propose that the concept of Network-Centric Warfare, although not a
panacea, is a means to improve our current performance and gain a superior level of
battle awareness. [Ref. 2 p. 11] Dr. Alberts' position as the special assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (C31) and the Director, Research and Strategic Planning
and Mr. Garstka's position on the J-6 staff are signs of the support the network centric
concept has gained in the Pentagon. The concept of Network-Centric Warfare uses
Information technology, distributed operations, and a flexible "infostructure" to leverage
warfare capabilities in the battlespace. The foundation for network centric warfare is the
efficient use of information. First, sensors must gather the information, and then
command and control assets must analyze and transmit the information. Finally, forces
and weapons systems must use the processed information to execute the mission. In
platform centric warfare, this process is sequential while network centric warfare
proposes near simultaneous performance of the three functions. Network centric warfare
creates power and value through the speed, accuracy, and robustness with which the all
elements of the military force form the battlespace picture.
Clausewitz explained that the difficulty in achieving a military objective is that
the commander has a different insight into the battlespace than his subordinates, which
results in opposition and an inertia that must be overcome before success. [Ref 16 p. 580]
The tremendous amount of information being transmitted in infinitely shorter amounts of
time is changing this view. The speed with which differing views of the battlespace can
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be resolved is the impetus for the shift to network centric operations. Dr. Alberts and Mr.
Garstka have observed companies such as Wal-Mart and Cisco Systems using shared
information to create a dominant position in their competitive market place. They propose
that networking the systems performing the three-steps of a mission will have the same
benefit for military forces. Furthermore, they subscribe to Metcalf s law that the potential
value of a network increases by the square of the number of nodes connected. [Ref. 2 p.
250]
Admiral Owens focuses on the potential value of networks when he states the
payoff from the Revolution of Military Affairs is in the overlaps of the three steps of a
mission. These overlaps of the function areas are the interfaces through which
information is shared. The platform-centric model places the sensor, command and
control systems, and offensive weapons on brilliant, expensive, and virtually independent
systems. The systems are often unbalanced in that the weapons can shoot farther than the
platforms sensors can see, or the sensors do not provide data sufficiently robust to create
a fire solution. The network-centric model proposes to correct these mismatches through
fusion of targeting, environmental, and situational information collected from multiple
sensors into a coherent battlespace picture. Additionally, this picture would be available
to all units. The commander would be able identify a target, select a platform and execute
prosecution using any combination of available platforms. [Ref. 44 p. 1] The key
difference between the network-centric and the platform-centric process is that the
network-centric process works on the principle of single data entry. Once a sensor picks
up a target, all other assets on the network have visibility and access to the information
for processing and action.
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With all the communication links available to commanders, the information for a
complete battlespace picture is arguably available now. Admiral Cebrowski, however,
emphasizes that information superiority and the value of relationship depends not only on
the availability of the data, but that '"there is value that is derived from the content,
quality, and timeliness of information moving between nodes on the network. This value
increases as information moves toward 1 00% relevant content, 100% accuracy, and zero
time delay—toward information superiority. [Ref. 12] The platform-centric organization
requires each unit to receive process and package information before transmitting it to
other assets. The network-centric model allows all assets to simultaneously, receive, fuse,
process and decide upon all data in the battlespace. It maximizes the interfaces between
platforms. Admiral Owens stated that network-centric warfare works through the value
generated by linking exceptional systems. "Merging our increasing capacity to gather real
time, all weather information continuously with our increasing capacity to process and
make sense of this voluminous data builds the realm of dominant battlespace knowledge
(DBK)." [Ref. 79 p. 4]
2. The Network of Programs
In making network centric warfare a reality, Dr. Alberts states that development




2. Use of rapid prototypes to allow users to get tangible representations of the
future;
3. Build-a-little, test-a-little philosophy; and
4. An architecture that accommodates the changes that will surely come. [Ref. 2
p. 208]
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These principles of development are at the heart of the revised DOD Directive
5000.2 effective 23 October 2000. The acceptance of iterative development suggests there
will not be a leap but an evolution from platform centric systems into a network centric
system of systems. The evolutionary process means that platforms in use today will be
the base from which industry will develop the infostructure for tomorrow. The researcher
relied on this assumption when he sought out current programs that either have been
established as part of the system of systems, or are being specifically designed to satisfy
the requirements of network centric warfare.
Although linkages between systems will actually be made at the component level,
this thesis asserts that the industry produces integrated weapon systems, not components.
This research, therefore, focuses its analysis at the networked systems not their
components. For example, the radios and radars of the F-22 will transmit to the
processing computers of Aegis ships and the Common Ground Station (CGS), however,
the Operational Requirement Document (ORD) and the Mission Needs Statement (MNS)
call for an interoperable aircraft not a flying radar and radio system.
The 1 996 Tecolote report on Sensor to Shooter networks evaluated costs of over
100 systems that the team considered critical to effective operations. The report classified
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5. Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)
6. Theater Air Defense
This Thesis combines SEAD, CAS, and Precision Strike into "Precision Strike".
The Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) loops for these missions are
essentially the same, although SEAD and Precision Strike against mobile targets require
shorter cycle times. Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Dominant Maneuver are
separate because of the coordination with naval assets required in OMFTS demand an
added level of networking.
Starting with the 100+ programs identified by the Tecolote report, the researcher
assessed the current literature of network-centric warfare concept papers, wargaming
documentation, and C4I structure reports to update that list. The literature review
identified programs canceled since Tecolote issued the 1996 report and added programs
that have started since. The systems are presented in Admiral Owens' three-lobe diagram
of mission functions. When a platform can perform more than one function, the
researcher placed it in the lobe of its primary functionality.
In network centric warfare, the sensor and communication systems will not be
restricted to a mission type. Commanders use the Predator UAV system to provide sensor
information to an aircraft on a precision strike mission as well as a Bradley fighting
vehicle performing a dominant maneuver. Many sensors and almost all of the
communication systems are used in more than one operational situation. The versatility of
these systems is evident in the number of diagrams within which they appear. Since the
weapon systems analyzed were developed for platform centric warfare, they almost all
have capabilities in multiple function areas. For example, the F/A-18 has onboard sensors
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and communication equipment as well as the capability to execute a weapons delivery.
To simplify analysis, the researcher selected a primary function for each platform. Not
every sensor could be a shooter, but every shooter would be able to provide information
for the network. Mapping the potential relationships demonstrates the extent of
interdependence between the systems. The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that this
system interdependence is influencing industry structure. An analysis of the depth of
interdependence is beyond its scope. The system of systems for each of the four
operational situations is listed below.
Key Programs for
Theater Area Defense
AWACS RSIP DD-21 DDG-5I
E-2C FDS NPOES
























Figure 2 TAD Programs Developed by Researcher
The researcher expanded the Tecolote Operational Situation (OPSIT) for Theater
Air Defense to Theater Area Defense (TAD) by the addition of the undersea battlespace.
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Although network centric examples focus on time-constrained air defenses, the
government expenditures in undersea warfare warrant its addition in the study.
The RDT&E Programs (R-l) exhibit of the FY2001 defense budget contains
twelve program elements totaling $232 million that expressly identify undersea
surveillance and defensive systems. The Procurement programs (P-l) exhibit expressly
lists 25 program elements totaling $205 million. Additionally, SSN 21 is a $13.2 billion
program and in 1998, the Naval Sea Systems Command placed a $4.2 billion order for
fourNSSNs.
The addition of the undersea battlespace only added sensors to the OPSIT's
network. First, at the level of this study, it seems appropriate to assume that undersea data
transmissions share bandwidth on government telecommunication satellites. Second,
although the NSSN and SSN-21 platforms perform multiple functions in potentially three
operational situations, the researcher classifies the platform as an undersea surveillance
system for the network. [Ref. 31 p. 46] The strike capability is the Tomahawk missile
system, which the researcher evaluates independent of its launching platform. The
platform's offensive undersea weapons (torpedoes) do not rely on targeting data other
than what onboard sensors provide. Finally, the TAD mission does not include the
Ballistic Missile Defense System. The system is not addressed because its components
are primarily the platforms listed. BMD and NMD are the system of systems in the
Tecolote report's theater air defense OPSIT. [Ref 30 p. 63]
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Key Programs for
Operational Maneuver From the Sea
ADS DD-21 DDG-51



















Figure 3 OMFTS Programs Developed by Researcher
As stated above, the researcher considers Operational Maneuver From The Sea
(OMFTS) a unique operation because of the battlespace complexities when moving
across the littorals to the objective. The objectives of OMFTS require dominant
knowledge of the air, surface and undersea environment. The evolution of network
centric systems for OMFTS operations, therefore, will emphasize the interoperability of
systems managed by all the services. This separate OPSIT additionally allows for an
analysis of the Navy's investments in amphibious assets
The title "swarming" comes from the US Force Designs and TO&E prepared for
the QDR wargames. Swarming is "the employment of small, fast, lethal ground combat
21
units which enable the friendly force to use maneuver to effect fires with great agility"
[Ref. 73] The wargames project a force for 2025. The vehicles that will deliver fire at the
speed demanded by the swarming concept are of a revolutionary design. The electronic
systems linking these vehicles to the network, however, are evolutionary. Each of the
armored programs listed above are going through upgrades or development enhancements
that increase connectivity. The evolutionary development of the swarming concept


























Figure 4 DM Programs Developed by Researcher
The precision strike elements are the most discussed aspects of network centric
warfare. Real time information to the cockpit and time critical targeting are network
centric solutions to a slow OODA loop compared to the speed with which mobile targets
move. The tight coupling between the sensors onboard the aircraft and the performance of
22
Unlike the submarine, the pilot of the aircraft can fire the weapon on target information
passed to it by an E-2C or some other sensor platform. The aircraft's systems must
therefore be able to communicate with the command and control aircraft as well as direct































Figure 5 PS Programs Developed by Researcher
The contracts between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the prime
contractors establish the terms of the supplier/buyer relationship for network centric
capabilities. This thesis focuses on the value added or integration work performed by the
prime contractors. Therefore, although the programs have diverse engineering and
component requirements, the scope of the industry is focused on a single capability. DoD
(the customer) is seeking the synergy of systems. The scope of the industry is therefore
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firms who manage the integration of components within systems and interoperability
between systems.
B. THE VALUE NET
1. Introduction
Adam Brandenburger of the Harvard Business School and Barry Nalebuff of Yale
are co-authors of the book "Co-opetition.", which introduces the Value-Net as a view of
the business environment through concepts of game theory. [Ref. 8 ] The application of






Figure 6 Value Net Axii From [Ref. 8 p. 17]
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The quadrants of this tool are Customers, Complementors, Suppliers, and
Competitors. Like the Porter Model, the firm or industry being analyzed is at the center of
the tool. [Ref. 8 p. 17] The vertical relationships of this quadrant are identical to those of
Porter's model. The suppliers are all firms and entities that provide a product or service
that is used in developing the company's marketed products. The customers are the
buyers of these products. The horizontal relationships are focused on value builders in
the relationship. The new entrants and substitutes of Porter's model are included as
competitors. "Complementors" is a classification created for this model. The firms and
entities at this node are those whose presence in the relationship share cost burdens or
increase sales potential. Co-opetition explains complementors using the relationship
between computer hardware and software as an example. The more complex the software
is, the more powerful the machines must be to operate it and vice versa. Therefore, the
advances in one market complement the other. [Ref. 8 p. 14]
Complex relationships between competitors and complementors are created when
competitors rely on the same resources. The value-net provides a unique way to map the
relationships between competitors and complementors. This adds to Porter's competitive
forces model. Where Porter views the industry's environment in terms of forces that must
be either confronted or avoided, the value-net views the environment as a web of
relationships that must be managed. [Ref. 82 p. 4] The value-net explores the possibility
of a proactive firm operating in line with oligopolistic theories. It considers control of
relationships as the source of competitive advantage. The amount of control each player
has in a relationship depends on the balance of value creation ability, or power, it brings
to the table. The net of suppliers, customers, competitors and complementors is used to
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subjectively measure the value each member brings to the relationship. The more value a
member brings to the relationship, the more power it has over the terms of the
relationship.
The value-net uses the quadrants to explain the value/power relationship. This
thesis uses the process Brandenburger and Nalebuff explained in their example analysis
of Nintendo's actions and strategy. The process requires a systematic review of the
players, Added Value, Rules, Tactics, and Scope of the relationship model. Each player
is identified and placed in its respective quadrant. [Ref. 8 p.l 15]











Figure 9 Nintendo Example From [Ref. 8 p. 115]
A general review of the players identifies their objectives for the relationship and
the amount of value creation they bring to the table. In the example relationship,
Nintendo had to compete with the buying power of the mega distribution systems of Wal-
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Mart and Toys "R" Us. If Nintendo produced enough cartridges to meet all the
distributors needs, its production value would be less than the stores' distribution value.
Nintendo, without a direct sales program, would become dependent on the toy stores.
Nintendo had two options, create a distribution system and compete with the stores, or
build the value of their production. With only one toy line, Nintendo did not have the
economies of scale to compete with distribution networks with the multiple toy lines sold
by the stores. It did have a means, however, to increase their value and diffuse the toy
store's buying power. By restricting the number of units produced, the orders for all the
stores would not be met. The stores therefore had to increase their added value (purchase
price) to the relationship or be one of the distributors without Nintendo cartridges. [Ref.
8 p. 115] This research studies the buyer seller environment and the strategies that DoD
and the prime contractors are employing to gain a comparative advantage in the value
game.
The rules of the Value-Net determine how the entities relate; they are the
contracts and regulations of the relationships. Nintendo used a security chip in its
hardware that required software writers to obtain an access license. This rule allowed
Nintendo to control what games were produced and how many. [Ref. 8 p. 112] Co-
opetition provides examples of other rules such as Most Favored Customer (MFC) and
Meet the Competition Clauses (MCC). How these rules are defined either promote or
reduce value for the members of the Value-Net. For example, game theory shows a
negative side to a MFC status if the seller as the greater power in the relationship. Under
an MFC agreement, a seller promises one buyer the best price and then creates an
incentive to ensure all the prices are in his/her favor. [Ref. 8 p. 162] In essence, the rules
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of the Value-Net, or the contracts of the business relationship will reveal positive or
negative incentives for value sharing. In this study, DoD is the main rule maker. This
study identifies the interoperability requirements and the 5000.2 directive, dual use and
open architecture initiatives and performance specifications as the three primary rules
affecting the business relationships.
Tactics are how entities in the Value-Net create and use perceptions to affect the
power/value relationship. Nintendo priced the hardware for their video games at a price
well below their competitors. This pricing tactic served two purposes. First, it established
a demand for their high-resolution games. The consumer demand for the games enabled
Nintendo's leveraging maneuver that increased their value with respect to the toy stores.
Second, it projected Nintendo's resolve and ability to capture the home video game
market. [Ref. 8 p. 112] The Value-Net does not identify how or the extent to which
tactics are used; it identifies their presence in the relationship and between the key
players. This study establishes potential areas where competitive tactics may affect
future competition. Additionally, it identifies the tactics that prime contractors use in
response to the DoD's rules.
The scope of the Value-Net is expressed in terms of the length of a relationship
and the number of relationships that are linked. A firm benefits from a relationship by
managing how linkages and time influence its power/value ratio. Nintendo used time as a
value builder when it decided not to allow their eight bit games compatibility with its 16
bit machines. Nintendo ended its relationship with 8 bit producers to ensure a recreation
of the value cycle with the 16 bit machines. [Ref 8 p. 239] DoD's recent initiatives
affecting the scope of their relationships are its competition policy, investment in science
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and technology, and desire for an 1 8-month life cycle for electronic systems. The industry
has increased its subcontracting and teaming arrangements as an effort to manage the
scope of their involvement.
As is evident by the Nintendo example and other excerpts from Co-opetition, the
Value-Net is a versatile tool that allows concise plotting of relationships. While it does
not produce a detailed measurement of competitive value. It does provide a comparative
analysis of the value/power relationship. This study uses this tool to highlight the
predominant players, rules, tactics, and relationship scope for each of the nodes in a
prime contractor DoD value-net. To apply the value-net model to the Government and its




















Figures 10 DoD Value Net Developed by Researcher
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Although Brandenburg and Nalebuff caution that drawing linked diagrams would
quickly get too complex to understand, a relatively simple level analysis of government
acquisitions should not pose a problem. For this model development, the Value-Net
model is rotated ninety degrees and overlapped at the purchaser node, which is the
Department of Defense. DOD's competitors may also be complementors. If the product
or service is a commercial item, production capacities may limit its availability creating a
competition against commercial users. This aspect is evident if you look at the recruiting
and labor force relationship or DoD's competition with the telecommunications industry
for circuits. At the same time, the scope of commercial sales may reduce costs either
through competition among sources or economies of scale. This aspect is becoming of
greater relevance as the traditional "Defense Firms" continue to divest and spread their
performance over both commercial and defense programs. As a firm's percentage of
Defense business shrinks in comparison to commercial business, the firm will gain more
value from their commercial relationships. This increases the power of the competitors
and complementors in DOD's Value-Net. Notice the crossed influences in the center of
the diagram. The cross with competitors is where the traditional Defense view of market
research takes place. DOD searches for competitors who will add value to the
relationship for itself and diminish the prime contractors power as a sole source entity.
The complementor link is less clear. To explain this, Brandenburger and Nalebuff discuss
the complementor relationships concerning the F-22. If DOD were to cut back on
purchases for avionics on other programs supported by the F-22 contractor, the reduced
production scale will increase those component costs in the F-22 program. [Ref. 8 p. 20]
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Although the value-net does not provide a detailed measurement of each party's added
value, it does provide qualitative principles that may yield a successful strategy. It is an
extension of the Porter Model in that it allows a more concise depiction of the
competitive forces. It merges the five-force concept with game theory. Game theory's
involvement gives the analyst room to consider competition as well as cooperation. It
therefore captures the essence of Porter's competitors and the Stakeholders cooperators.
By capturing the relationship in terms of players, added value, rules, tactics, and scope,
this study analyzes the balance of value and power relationships in the industry for
network centric warfare.
2. Value-Net Application
The Department of Defense (DoD) and the industry or prime integrators are the
two primary nodes of the value-net. DoD is such a complex entity that selecting a unitary
actor that develops a grand plan for achieving national defense is very difficult. There are,
however three initiatives since the early 1 990's that this thesis uses to define DoD's rules
and tactics. It looks at the value and power created by the emphasis on interoperable
systems, the use of performance specifications, and the drive for dual use and open
architecture in technology development. The researcher considers the budget reductions
since the early 1 990's as an element of the environment. The reductions certainly affect
the relationships between DoD and the industry, but DoD does not have direct control
over them. The budget cuts, therefore, are not considered a tactic or rule imposed by
DoD. For the purpose of this study, the researcher will focus on the global arms market as
a complementor and the commercial technology market at a competitor to DoD.
31
The industry is defined as the prime integrators for the OPSITs defined above.
This is not the standard view of the defense industry. It assumes a marked difference
between the core responsibilities of the prime contractors and the first and second tier
subcontractors. The majority of the prime contractors' efforts are focused on integration
of systems, which are produced by the subcontractors. The subcontractors are focused on
developing superior technology and quality at the component or subsystem level. The
large contractors have specialized as system integrators and are maintaining a reduced
production capability. This study classifies the value added performance of the primes as
integration and design. The subcontractors develop the components, which are
increasingly commercial in nature. The concentration of the industry is defined using the
percentage of the primes' value added performance for each OPSIT and then for the total
network centric defense system. The four firms with the highest percentage of value
added to the network centric defense are the competitors at the company node shown
above. The researcher derives the concentration figures from data provided by the
program integrators at Defense Contract Management Centers (DCMC) performing
administrative functions for the programs listed above. The program integrators were
asked the following questions:
1
.
Who is the prime contractor for the program in question?
2. What is the total dollar value of active contracts?
3. What is the percentage of performance (in terms of contract value) that the prime
contractor performs in lieu of subcontracting or purchase?
4. What is the nature of the primes performance? (I.E. Integration and design or
component development of a sensor, communicator, or shooter/platform.)
The work performed by the prime contractors is categorized as the development
of sensor, communications, or weapons components or as integration and design services.
32
This research focuses on the percent of available contract dollars received for the
integration services. The percentage of available contract dollars received for component
development across systems provides an insight into vertical integration attempts at the
platform level. Much detailed data on subcontracts and component systems, however, is
proprietary, making an in depth analysis beyond the scope of this thesis. Additionally, the
classifications of performance are too broad to provide a reasonable measurement of
industry concentration for major components. [Ref. 91 p. 73]
3. Economic Principles
F.M. Scherer referred to economic theory as knowledge required to "forge
rigorous predictive links between fundamental assumptions and their behavioral
consequences." [Ref. 91 p. 2] The value-net identifies key elements of the DoD-to-
prime-contractor relationship which form the researchers assumptions of industry
structure. Through the application of economic theory, this thesis predicts the likely
strategies the contractors are using to establish their competitive advantage. Strategies are
behavioral consequences. The research focuses on areas where the economics of network
centric warfare production requires a different structure than the industry has created for
platform centric warfare production. Once the differences are identified, it determines if
and how contractors are making the shift to the new industry structure.
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III. DATA PRESENTATION: EXTERNAL FORCES
A. INTRODUCTION
There are five players involved in the value-net. The Government, the traditional
defense contractors, commercial technology firms, international governments, and
international defense firms. The DoD and the traditional defense contractors are the
primary players. The rules established by DoD dictate the nature of involvement for the
remaining three players. How DoD shapes its relationship with the traditional defense
firms dictates the positioning of the international and commercial players along the
vertical plane of the value-net. This chapter reports the players, rules, tactics and scope
of involvement between DoD and the traditional defense firms and the value building
characteristics of the international and commercial players. It is broken down into
sections listing each node of the value net. Each section contains an itemization of
chronological events, policy statements, or as in the case of the industry distribution data
that indicate significant signals for the defense industry. At the end of each section, there
is a recap of the significant players, rules, tactics, and changes of scope affecting
industry strategy.
B. THE ENVIRONMENT
The first step in filling out the Value Net is establishing the environment within
which DoD and the traditional defense frims relate. The two key elements of the
environment are money and technology. Building a military requires money, which is
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dependent upon the support of the American people. Maintenance of the existin military
requires either more funds or a reorganization that reduces the demand for funds. Future
funding will not be substantially above the existing level, eliminating the opportunity to
proceed into the future unchanged. [Ref. 98 p. 10] U.S. military spending has never
witnessed a sustained peacetime increase. Additionally, the growth of entitlement outlays
since the early 1970's now accounts for more than half of the Government budget. DoD
is now competing with the rest of the Government departments for a smaller fraction of
available funds. The following two charts show the relatively constant level of defense
spending compared to the growth of mandatory spending sinde 1962 and how the
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Additionally, the cold war inventory was declared to be well above the required
structure for post cold war activities. The Bottom Up review of 1993 signaled that the
platform development industry did not have growth potential. The review established that
maintaining existing levels of military force structure would come at the expense of
investment Therefore, increased mobility requirements would be met by already
developed systems; modernization would be incremental, generally as upgrades to the
existing systems. [Ref. 63 p. 79]
The definition of technology for this analysis is the full spectrum of advancement.
It is technical knowledge, development processes, and the resultant applications of
research. Under this broad definition, there has been a long-standing bond of
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commonality between commercial and defense advancements. Pre World War II
technology was intrinsically dual applicable, with trucks, airplanes, and ships relying on
the same technical developments. Post World War II, however, there has been a marked
divergence of the applications of commercial and defense systems. The missiles, aircraft,
ships and tanks, of today appear to have much less technical relevance for commercial
applications. [Ref. 3 p. 37] From World War II, through the 1970's, Defense technology
and processes spun off to commercial development. Foundational engineering and design
tools such as finite-element method (FEM) programs, computational fluid dynamics
(CFD), closed loop control systems, and numerical control machine tools, started under
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The Government's position in the 1970's as the technology leader was justifiably
based on the Government making a much larger investment in R&D programs. The
recent history of R&D investment, however, shows an explosion of commercial funding
versus DoD investment. Leading edge technical knowledge now resides generally with
the commercial sector, which is investing almost three times as much as DoD. The
unprecedented growth of the technology markets has also led to DoD's dependence on
the advancements of commercial applications of technology. In 1975, DoD's share of the
worldwide semiconductor market was 17 percent; in 1995 it was just 1.3 percent. [Ref.
63] DoD's purchasing decisions influenced the economies of scale of industry production
in the past, but DoD is now subject to the power of much larger customers. The
traditional view of technological spin off from defense developments has inverted. DoD
is now seeking to spin on technologies and shape its products to capture the economies of
scale.
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFLUENCES
1. Vision Statements Signal the Requirement
The definition of the players in the value-net must start with DoD. DoD is a
unique player. As part of the sovereign Government, it has a large amount of control over
the remaining players. Who in the DoD and the Government is the player in the value-
net? There are a myriad of actors with specific concerns and a certain amount of
influence over the relationship between the firm and DoD. Congress appropriates the
funds, the President develops the budget, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the
requirement documents, the Secretary of Defense approves the acquisition strategy, the
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Services and the systems commands manage the acquisitions; the Federal Trade
Commission and Department of Justice regulate corporate activities. These functions of
the Government have different ranges of influences. The Congressional and Presidential
budget decisions are relatively short term with only two years of reliable numbers and
five years of estimates. The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice
decisions establish limits of corporate activity and have stable goals motivating their
enforcement. The two most powerful influences on the DoD industry relationship
emanate from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Both
offices have a shape the long-range goals and concepts for National Defense through the
Defense Planning Guidance and the Chairman's Assessment. The Secretary of Defense,
additionally, has influence over the scope of the industry through his procurement
approval process, antitrust inputs into the FTC, and approval of privatization initiatives.
[Ref. 63 p. 6]
The historical view of DoD's acquisition power points to the Services and their
program executive offices as the wielders of DoD influence on the defense industry.
When asked to decipher what influences strategic planning by key members of the
defense, the Honorable H. Lee Buchanan III replied that the industry's need for profit
causes them to focus closely on the organization that holds the money. Since the three
Services control the programming of funds, not the Joint Chiefs, this suggests that they
are the requirements generators. Admiral Owens alludes to this when discussing the
impediments to a true revolution of military affairs. "Specialization reflects the long and
inbred preference within the U.S. military to support one's own Service above the others.
It takes advantage of inherent efficiencies in the integrated traditions, doctrines,
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discipline, and procedures of a single Service and not a joint force. [Ref. 80 p. 227]
Admiral Owens concedes this, but he also agrees that since General Colin Powell held the
CJCS post, the Joint Chiefs have had a growing influence over the way programs are
planned and budgeted. Admiral Owens' own installment of the Joint Warfare Capabilities
Assessment Matrix had a pivotal effect on the program evaluation process. [Ref. 80 p.
173] The perceived influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is critical to its implications as a
player in the value-net because the joint vision and studies established in the early 1990's
are key forces behind the shift in the industry's core products.
In the 1970's, Soviet theorists believed a technological revolution in military
operations was the near at hand. They observed the U.S. Defense organization
demonstrate the capabilities and potential attainment of the revolution during Desert
Storm. It was during this same period that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in
particular Andrew Marshall, (Director of Net Assessment), was leading concept studies
on the Revolution of Military Affairs and networked warfare. [Ref. 41] The Secretary
divided the concept studies by specialty and assigned them to service teams for execution.
By 1994, the Services produced a series of vision defining documents The Army
published its study results in Pamphlet 525-5 Force XXL The Air Force developed
Spacecast 2020 and Air Force 2025. The Navy produced From the Sea, which led to
Forward from the Sea and Operational Maneuver From The Sea.
Force XXI describes information technology as having a thousand-fold
advancement in the near future with dramatic affects on the way the Army wages war. It
points out that the Army will press the advantage created by the speed and completeness
of information. Operations "will involve the coexistence of both hierarchical and
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internetted, nonhierarchical processes." [Ref. 99] It additionally defines the potential for
cyclic or incremental acquisitions of systems as innovation and rapid technological
advancements surpass the Army's warfare capabilities. [Ref. 99] Finally, the doctrine
implies that the bulk of the Army's near term efforts in developing Force XXI would be
aimed at information technologies. It states "During the first two decades of the twenty-
first century, the Army will be at the emerging edge of knowledge-based land warfare."
[Ref. 99] It goes on to express that knowledge management technology for the next
century already exists, without discussing the propulsion and material technologies
required for the faster more lethal force. The implied inference is that systems would be
upgraded electronically before being replaced with next-generation faster and lighter
units.
Spacecast 2020, highlights the same critical attributes for the acquisition of a
future force. It states that transforming technology advancements in national security
capabilities requires a three-pronged effort. First is tracking and spinning on
technological advancements made by the commercial sector in the areas of computers,
electronics and communications. Second, is a Government commitment to research and
development efforts in all areas of national security. This includes "leading the way " in
areas that require a tremendous amount of research funding. [Ref. 94] The theory of
global view, reach and power presupposes a massive amount of data to be collected,
transmitted, and fused across computer processors. A majority of the technological
advancements required for Spacecast 2020 already reside in the rapidly advancing
commercial sector. [Ref. 94]
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Air Force 2025 built on Spacecast 2020 and projected the Air Force thirty years
into the future. The analysis uses three dominant characteristics to shape eight conditional
worlds of the future. It then selects the four most challenging worlds to derive the
requirements for the Air Force in 2025. As in previous documents, it does not propose
building power on individual systems. The document suggests leveraging information in
a global information grid, and using microelectronics to apply precision strikes with
many deployable systems. The review of the proposed systems identified the commercial
sector as the base for technology, computers, electronics, communications, and for future
defense funding. The paper on the World Wide Information Control System (WICS)
concisely portrays attainment of Air Force 2025. "There is a high probability a system
like WICS could be functioning in 30 years. The commercial sector is currently driving
the market for advances in computing and communications technology because of the
public's growing appetite for information access and mobile portable communications.
Potential military applications cannot be ignored." [Ref. 63 p. 6]
"Forward from the Sea" is the only conceptual document of the Services that does
not signal that future military acquisitions will be heavily reliant upon electronic and
information management technologies. This document and its predecessor concentrate on
shifting the Navy's operations from deep water to the littorals and expeditionary warfare.
The Marine successor to Forward from the Sea, Operational Maneuver from the Sea
likewise stresses conceptual changes to amphibious assault, especially the importance of
achieving the objective without a pause or buildup at the beach. Although it does not
stress development of future systems, it does identify intelligence and communication
technology as significant enablers. [Ref. 79]
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While the Navy announced concepts without addressing technology, it did study
the power of information technology. From November 1995 to May 1996, Vice Admiral
Cebrowski as director for Command Control Communications and Computer Systems,
C4 conducted a study on the Advanced Battle Space Information Systems (ABIS). The
results of this study are what have developed into the network centric warfare concept.
Again, the key element that shapes the future defense industry product is the need for
robust C4 capabilities based on advanced technologies in the information systems and
communication sector. "The ABIS of the future depends on advanced information
technologies from microelectronics to software." [Ref. 39] An additional stipulation of
this report is that the information systems technologies must be upgraded at a much faster
pace than the traditional perception of warfare capabilities. "The specific technical or
operational advantage that an information product or systems application delivers will
erode over time. Continual assimilation and enhancement of new technologies, products,
and military applications are necessary to retain information superiority and maintain
military dominance."[Ref. 39]
In 1996, Joint Vision 2010 channeled the independent efforts of the services into a
joint concept. The vision sees enablers of battle dominance in the areas of logistics,
dominant maneuver, precision strike, and full dimension protection. This document and
its immediate successor Concept of Future Joint Operations, promote full spectrum
dominance through combined forces, but do not explicitly address the traditional
divisions of warfare by the services. They do echo the signal that leveraging information
technology is the near term method of development for the military. "JV2010 is built on




advances—should make possible a new level ofjoint operations capability. Underlying a
variety of technological innovations is information superiority—the capability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or
denying and adversary's ability to do the same.[Ref. 14 p. I]
The report on the Quadrennial Defense Review and the discussion around it
started the translating the services' and the joint visions into defense acquisition policy.
Although the report was controversial because of its political tones and the inclusion of
the budget environment in its decision-making, the message to industry about the role of
technology in the future DoD systems was clear cut. While addressing the Brookings
Institution, Secretary Cohen stated that the platforms of the present will suffice in the
near future, but a modernization is needed for the force after next. He went on to address
how the modernization would come about:
This future force will embody the concepts set forth by General Shalikashvili in "Joint
Vision 2010." It will seek the best people our nation can offer, equipped with the best
technology our imagination can offer. And by harnessing the information technology
revolution, we will transform the way our forces fight. We want them to be able to
dominate any situation we send them into. We don't want a fair fight — we want a
decisive advantage. This means continuing to build an integrated "system of systems" to
give them comprehensive battlespace awareness and cut through the fog of war. This
system of systems will integrate the laptop, the microchip, the microwave, the videocam,
the satellite and the sensor. It will connect the cockpit, the quarterdeck, the control panel
and the command post, and it will link the commander to the frontlines and the supply
lines. [Ref. 17]
Secretary Cohen then went on to address the limited budget and the $265 billion
dollar question. He explained that the transformation to the future force will require a
general sustainment of the existing forces, while investing in the future force with a plan
that introduces new systems at the "right pace". [Ref. 17]
In 1998, the Navy addressed the technological considerations and revolution of
military affairs issues with the presentation of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). While
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the sister Services' and joint vision documents address the commercial advancements to
be spun on to defense operations in general terms, the network centric warfare concept
narrows the scope of the technology definition. It starts with a study of commercial
technologies in use today and identifies architectural and capability sets that have defense
applicability. In promoting the NCW concept Vice Admiral Cebrowski gives an example
of how NCW capabilities vastly improve the kill ratio of the High-speed Anti-Radiation
Missile (HARM) [Ref. 12] The signal once again is that existing platforms will be
modernized through the infusion of advanced information technologies.
The Services are using these visions as building blocks for the development of
future DoD systems. In his testimony to the subcommittee on airland forces, Lieutenant
General Kern, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research
Development and Acquisition, states that the Army is modernizing through the Force
XXI process. He additionally states that the Army is following a process of
recapitalization. "The Army maintains the usability and effectiveness of present systems
rather than investing in entirely new systems. The Army achieves recapitilization through
extended life service programs, preplanned product improvements, depot rebuild, limited
replacement, or technology insertion." [Ref 53]
The Navy has applied the concept of value added through information and
command and control technology to their new development systems. The General
Accounting Office report on the Navy's plans to acquire the F/A-18E/F with a multiyear
procurement the GAO considered the engine underpowered. The Navy's response was
that technological advancements linking the pilot to the missile would compensate for the
reduced power. "The Navy does not currently plan to develop a new engine for the F/A-
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18E/F to correct these deficiencies because it believes that future upgrades to the
aircraft—such as the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System and the AIM-9X missile
—
will provide capabilities that will make the speed and maneuverability of the aircraft less
critical in close-in aerial combat."[Ref. 103 p. 5]
As pointed out above, although the joint concept is growing, the Services have
been developing integrated systems of systems that are for the most part enclosed in then-
specialties. Admiral Owens addresses the simulation of jointness during his analysis of
the Kosovo engagement. The most telling indication of the failure of jointness is Task
Force Hawk. The Apache Longbow helicopters did not fit into the Air Force concept of
operations, nor did they communicate with the JSTARS, EC-130, or F-16J's as the
information network required. [Ref. 80 p. 11]
Whether it was due to an analysis of the lessons learned from Kosovo or not, three
documents produced in the last eighteen months have added the most defining product
requirement for the defense industry. The DoD Directive 5000.2, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instructions 3 170.01A and 6 126.0 IB define a measure of interoperability in all programs.
The 5000.2, affects all existing programs and states that they must be able to "provide
data, information, materiel, and services to and accept the same from other systems, units,
or forces, and to use the data, information, materiel, and services so exchanged to enable
them to operate effectively together." [Ref. 75 p. 11] The key factor of this requirement is
that the Milestone Decision Authority will base his or her decision of operability on the
family of systems within which the program is expected to operate. Additionally the
directive establishes an interoperability key performance parameter in accordance with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions. CJCSI 3 170.01A defines the requirements
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generation process. The document defines the Joint Requirement as a requirement that
impacts more than one DoD component, and then states that all command control
communications computers intelligence sensor and reconnaissance (C4ISR) programs are
inherently joint because of their interoperability integration needs. [Ref. 15 p. A-2] The
document further establishes the approval process for the interoperability key
performance factor. In accordance with this instruction, the J6 staff will evaluate and
certify that all Operational Requirements Documents (ORD), Capability Requirements
Documents (CRD), and Mission Needs Statements (MNS) regardless of acquisition
category conform to interoperability requirements for their family of systems, system of
systems, or for allied forces if applicable. [Ref. 15 p. B-4]
The CJCSI 6162.01B defines how the program officers are to present the
interoperability requirements. It stipulates that in the formulation of the acquisition plan
program managers must develop a matrix showing all of the top level Information
Exchange Requirements (IER). It must delineate what systems it will transfer information
with, why the information is transferred, what information is transferred, and how it will
be transferred. The IERs must be plotted for every other system in the program's Family
of Systems, Systems of Systems, or if applicable any systems it is expected to operate
with external to them. It stipulates that at the original stages, unknowns are acceptable,
but all IERs should be known at Milestone II. [Ref 15 p. B-l-4] As an illustration of the
complexity of the interoperability requirement, the instruction provides a sample graphic
showing the System of Systems for THAAD.
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2. The Shift to Performance Specifications
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff were stating a vision based on commercial
advancements and technology, Defense Secretary Perry pursued acquisition policies that
would gain access to those technologies. He opened the 1994 White Paper on
specifications and standards with "To meet future needs, the Department of Defense must
increase access to commercial state-of-the-art technology and must facilitate the adoption
by its suppliers of business processes characteristics of world class suppliers." [Ref. 81]
The White Paper instituted three changes that affect industry's development practices.
First, it eliminated the requirement for program officers' use of specifications and
standards listed in 5000.2. Second, it eliminated binding power of references below the
first tier. If a program referenced a specification, it could only be used as a form, fit or
function guidance. This removed all specification requirements below the prime
contractor level. The primes were allowed to seek subcontractor development of
component systems that only met the form fit or function of its military specified (Mil
Spec) predecessors. Finally, it encouraged the use and development of non-governmental
standards that are consistent with the trends of commercial practices. [Ref. 81] In the 18
months following the release of Secretary Perry's white paper, the Defense Standards
Improvement Council oversaw the screening of every military specification and standard
in the DoD index with the intent of canceling, inactivating or replacing it with a
performance specification. [Ref. 89 ] This directional shift from designed specifications
to form fit and function requirements dovetailed with the signing and implementation of
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA). FASA instituted a broader definition
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of commercial items. [Ref. 98 p. 114] The combination of these to policy changes
completes the transfer from specialized military components to commercial products. The
following example clarifies the process. The Air Force was acquiring a transistor with a
Milspec requirement of 2500 pounds. They reviewed the specification and found the
performance only required 1600 pounds. Then under a final review determined that
commercial spec transistors met the performance requirement. The ultimate savings due
to the shift to commercial specifications were greater than $25 per part, but more
importantly, the method of procurement changed. [Ref. 98 p. 114] In 1994, there were
over forty five thousand specifications and standards of which 75% were military or
Federal detail specifications or standards. In 1999, there were twenty eight thousand
specification and standards of which 43% were military or Federal detail specifications or
standards and 8% were performance.
3. Dual Use Initiatives
As stated above, the history of formal or informal dual use programs extend to
before World War II. The focus of this research is on the industrial policy and dual use
programs starting with the changes the Clinton administration made to the Technical
Reinvestment Program (TRP) before its implementation. The TRP was developed to
assist the U.S. industry in capturing a lead in technologies that have potential competitive
advantages due to early entrance and dominance. The Clinton era announced its goal as
job rejuvenation for the Defense Industry affected by budget cuts. The program designers,
however, designed it to capture technologies outside the defense industry's traditional
scope. The defense firms saw the initial version ofTRP as increasing their competition by
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attracting commercial firms into defense development projects. [Ref 63 p. 106] In the
face of these fears, the Administration hoped to incentivize partnerships between defense
firms with capital and small commercial businesses with innovative technologies. [Ref.
63 p. 130] The plan designated specific areas of research and required industry take up
50% of the research costs. Due to political problems, and lack of substantial rewards, the
program foundered. In the 1 997, House Resolution 1119 The National Defense
Authorization Act created the Dual Use Science & Technology program. It initially
authorized $75 Million for 1998 investments and set obligation goals for DoD applied
research funds. The goals start at 5% in 1998 and increase to 15% in 2001. [Ref 48. P. 1]
The program is similar to TRP in that it is seeking research partnerships in focused areas
and the subject products must have a defined military and commercial application. The
touted benefits of the program are leveraging scarce Science and Technology funding,
promoting industry-to-industry partnerships as well as industry to defense and university
partnerships, creating greater access to advanced technologies, and creating markets
through defense development of the technologies. [Ref. 33 ]
4. Open and Joint Technical Architecture
In November of 1995, the Assistant Secretary for Defense for C3I systems
released a directive tasking the services to "reach a consensus of a working set of
standards" and "establish a single, unifying DoD technical architecture that will become
binding on all future DoD C4I acquisitions*'. Subsequently a Joint Technical Architecture
Working Group was established and in August of 1996, the Under Secretary for Defense
for Acquisition Technology and Logistics and the Assistant Secretary for C3I signed out
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the first version of the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA). [Ref. 51 p. 4] The JTA aimed
to reduce cost, development and fielding times and increase portability, the use of
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) components, and lessen upgrade and interoperability
conflicts. [Ref. 65] The architecture is structured in three layers; core, domain and sub
domain level.
The core has a minimum number of mature commercial standards that promote
information transfer and commonality between all systems. This core of standards must
be met by all DoD systems. There are four domains below the core: Combat Support,
C4ISR, Modeling and Simulation, and Weapon Systems. Each of these domains again
has the least number of standards possible that are peculiar to its systems. Finally, at the
sub domain level there are twelve areas again each with their own characteristic standards
that must be met.
In the spirit of acquisition reform, the applied standards must enhance
interoperability, be widely accepted in the market place (mature), technically
implementable, and be public. [Ref. 51 p. 11] The Office of the Secretary of Defense
components, Military Departments, the Office of the Joint Chiefs, Unified and Support
Commanders, and the Intelligence Community form up the Architecture Coordination
Council, which is the final approval authority for the JTA. Their overarching goal is to
move the development of systems to an open architecture and promote seamless
interoperability between defense systems and organizations by reducing the number of
domain and subdomain architecture requirements. The Defense Science Board's Open
Systems Task Force described the goal of open systems as the achievement of plug and
fight, plug and play, and COTS insertion capabilities. [Ref 39 P. 6]
52
Plug and Fight is the ability of whole systems of systems to operate together. A
relatively simple example is the seamless coordination of the operators and systems of the
Navy's Aegis units and the Army's Patriot units. It means that when Aegis receives a data
packet from a Patriot system, the operators will understand the symbology, and the
Army's prosecution process, thus preventing a conflict. It ensures the Commander's
intent is understood and acted upon by both systems. In essence, Plug and Fight is the
ability for both the systems and the operators to communicate and execute on a common
language and doctrine.
The Plug and Play level is what we commonly understand, as interoperability at
the system level. The components are universally interchangeable and common interfaces
allow universal communication between systems. The use of Commercial Off The Shelf
(COTS) and plug and play capabilities are complementary in this respect. COTS items
create increased plug and play capabilities and the minimal standards of plug and play
design goals increase the use of COTS. Additionally, the board viewed open systems
architecture as the key to systems viability. Through open system architecture, a platform
would be able to upgrade as quickly as the life cycle of its subsystems require.
The Defense Science Board analyzed cycle rates and confirmed that platform
structures have stable cycle rates for 30-50 years, basic architectural elements' cycles are
stable for 10 - 15 years, and electronic components are stable for 18-36 months. [Ref. 40
p. 45] The task force provided two programs as examples of the trend towards layering of
systems and modular designs. The Boeing Oscar TACAIR data processor is an example
of how modular design mnimizes and standardizes the interface points for the high cycle
components and preserves the architecture and backbone of the system. The Navy
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Submarine Combat Control and C3I Systems is an example of developing the system
such that the electronic component level is "isolated" from the basic architecture and
platform. The isolation makes it easy to plug and play components without changing the
architecture of the entire system. [Ref. 40 p. 22]
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Additionally, the Combat Control System was developed as a replacement system
for the obsolete and unaffordable BSY-2 System. The open system architecture and
COTS compliant components created a system 57 times more capable, with 18% of the
development costs, 50% of the development time, and 22% of the installation cost. [Ref.
40 p. 22] At the system level, program offices use a rigorous process and an Architectural
Control Board (ACB) to move to open systems. One identified difficulty with the move
to open systems, however, is the interaction with legacy systems, which often have
proprietary architecture and component specifications. [Ref. 40 p. 7]
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In 1998, the report stated that the success of some programs does not signal that
DoD has in general accepted Open Systems development. The main reason given was
that at the time, DoD leadership had not fully supported the concept. [Ref. 40 p. 51] The
changes to 5000.2 and rewrites of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions indicate that the
leadership has increased the emphasis for open systems development and plug and play
capabilities.
In a conversation with Mr. Ted Stanford, Deputy Program Manger for the
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), he said; "communicating is easy." [Ref. 95]
In further discussion, it became clear that he felt the actual transfer of information from
one unit to another (plug and play) is becoming easier. What is more difficult, however, is
getting the systems to act on the information to an adequate level of performance (plug
and fight). He provided an example of the different ways the Automatic Carrier Landing
System (ACLS) and an Aegis destroyer react to a signal of an aircraft approaching with a
descending flight path and not transmitting an Identification Friendly or Foe (IFF) signal.
The carrier will receive the data as a landing aircraft and accept it into its system, while
the Aegis system will hold it as an incoming hostile and target it. CEC can easily pick up
the information packet from the carrier and transmit it to any other unit in the battlegroup.
An Aegis unit, however, will clearly understand the information, but because of the
imbedded combat doctrine in the software will process the information in a way not
intended or desireable. These conflicts at the plug and fight level are the source of
potential prime contractor involvement as DoD strives for the total force interoperability
required by network centric warfare.
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5. Department of Defense Summary
The key players in DoD are the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
Defense. Although the Service components have the access funds and interface directly
with the industry on individual programs, the Joint Chiefs have exercised considerable
influence in shaping the long-term vision for DoD requirements. As the decisions and
actions of the program offices experience increased guidance from the OSD and JCS
staffs, the industry will witness strong signals that have a greater impact through long-
term survivability than short-term profit gain.
The important rules are technology capture and an interoperable system of
systems. DoD sees value in a firm that will bring innovative, but tested, technology to
existing systems fast. Additionally, DoD is constantly looking for the next innovation to
give weapons systems the dominant edge. The interoperability rule is a complication
because innovative technology must work seamlessly with all the other stages of
technology in the system of systems. Defense industry must consider cost, competition
and resource implications of these two rules with every project they undertake.
The use of performance specifications, dual use technology initiatives and open
systems architecture requirements are tactics within the Value Net model. DoD is trying
to tap the wealth of commercial technology directly. It is implementing policy that will
increase pressure for innovation. The industry must break down proprietary information
wall that it successfully built over the 1970's and 80's or its system components will not
meet the interoperability requirement. While the industry is making itself vulnerable to
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new entrants, DoD is seeking out potential competitors with larger economies of scale in
the commercial market.
The scope of the relationship has undergone a transformation to match the levels
of the JTA. The major systems are now just the top end of the scope equation. This top
end is reduced considerably. Platform structures are expected to last 30 years or more,
and production numbers are expected to match the reduced size of the military and
increased leverage created by technology at the lower levels of the architecture.
The middle architecture is the last refuge of proprietary knowledge. The
architecture sockets must be open to allow the new and short life cycle components, but
the process must marry with specifically tailored service or operational doctrine. At this
intersection of code and doctrine, systems integrators have proprietary insights. The
lowest level component systems are treated as a technology commodity open to free
competition with any innovator that can improve upon universal structures and public
architecture.
D. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES
Defense spending in the three global regions matched political environments.
Spending in the European theater declined with the end of the cold war. NATO
reductions have stopped, with some increases in spending visible. The Pacific Allies of
Japan and Korea have not reduced spending, but showed a slowed increase due to their
economic situation in the early to mid 1990's. The increase in spending in 1998 is an
indication of how improved economic conditions have allowed them to focus on their
national security concerns. The Gulf Cooperation Council shows a continuous increase in
spending due to the tensions in the area, after correcting for the effect of the Gulf War.
57
PercentA Allied Spending from 1990
-- GCC*^r- Pacific—*— EU









n no/ _ m——
—
u.u /o-




1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
' Distorted due to Gulf War Using 1998 dollars &
Exchange rates
Figure 15 International Defense Spending After [Ref. 88]
The lessons learned from the Kosovo air war, identified a dramatic difference in
capabilities between U.S. and Allied forces. [Ref. 80 p. 190] In a speech to NATO on
June 19, 1999, the Honorable Jacques Gansler emphasized that the future of warfare will
require increased coalition involvement, and must be swift and decisive, meaning
execution in days and even hours, much faster than NATO has traditionally acted. He
went on to state that the U.S. is using information technology to leverage its military
capabilities and the success of coalition operations requires that NATO and other allied
forces be prepared to do the same. [Ref. 43] Since the U.S. has 46% of the allied tactical
aircraft inventory, 44% of the ground capability, and 58% of the naval force tonnage, it
seems reasonable to assume the U.S. will drive the NATO interoperability standard.
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Global industry structure has a strong influence on the structure of the domestic
industrial base. Either with offsets in the foreign military sales process or the
attractiveness of foreign production, the number of co-production and co-development
projects has risen. Co-production is the international sharing of manufacturing. Co-
development is the international sharing of design responsibilities. Since 1980, there has
been approximately a 50% increase in Trans-Atlantic Co-production programs/Co-
development programs every five years. [Ref. 63 p. 312] There has also been a
comparable increase in Co-development/Co-production programs in the developing
world. [Ref. 63 p. 313] Recent history, however, has witnessed a dramatic change in the
Co-development and joint venture projects between the U.S. and the European theater.
Between 1976 and 1990, the number of intra-European and transatlantic joint venture
programs has been about equal. Since 1990, however, the number of intra European joint
ventures has outnumbered the transatlantic ventures by more than a 2 to 1 margin. [Ref.
63 p. 322] The recent merger activity in European defense firms has reinforced the
separating trend and produced European defense companies comparable in size to the
biggest U.S. firms. In 1996, the United Kingdom acquired over six billion dollars of new
defense procurement with UK firms. This uncharacteristically high use of British firms
over U.S. suppliers is yet another signal that the European nations are seeking alternative
sources to U.S. industry. [Ref. 62 p. 218]
The key players at this Value Net node are the Allied Governments and the
European defense industry. The Allied Governments must upgrade their forces to
maintain a compatibility with the U.S. system of systems. All of the Allied blocs are
increasing defense expenditures, trying to keep pace with the revolution of military
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affairs. The presence of a growing international market creates some growth in the
middle level or platform segment. If the U.S. defense firms can capture the sales from this
growing market, they will bolster their economies of scale and increase domestic
competitiveness.
The growth in defense requirements in their countries and elsewhere also creates
an opportunity for the revival of the European Defense Industry. The tactics employed by
the European governments are use of offsets and recent preferences for home built
systems. European industries have leveraged their technology and production base to
create a become competitor for the U.S. defense industry. At the same time, the European
industry is undergoing a consolidation phase to bolster its competitiveness against the
U.S. industry. The U.S. defense industry must, therefore exploit the interoperability
requirement to reduce the influence of government-supported defense firms from Europe.
In essence, the Allied nations must balance between nationalism and the need to be
interoperable with 45% of the world's forces created by the U.S industry.
E. COMMERCIAL SALES AND PRODUCERS
The use of performance specifications, dual use investment programs, and open
systems architecture policies discussed above target commercial industry. In 1998, budget
estimates for savings due to commercial purchase were between $10 billion and $20
billion. [Ref. 63 p. 214] Three General Accounting Office (GAO) reports identify three
different levels of acquisition where commercial firms could enter the defense industry.
An analysis of satellite control systems identified commercial systems that were better
than government developed systems. The report on the Army's Family of Medium
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Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) program and their Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET)
identified instances where commercial products with minor adjustments (NDI) products
met defense requirements. Finally, The Air Force Materiel Command sponsored pilot
program for components in the F-22 system, which highlighted how changes in
architecture and specifications allow substitution of commercially built components at the
subcontractor level.
In May of 1999, GAO reported on DoD's progress in integrating and improving
its satellite control capabilities. It looked at the Air Force and Navy's attempts to upgrade
their aging satellite control systems. The two satellite control systems were government
developed. The Air Force system was developed with proprietary software and very
costly to maintain. The Navy system required replacement because the firm that provided
the computers eliminated their software maintenance capability.
In 1995, the Air Force decided to acquire an integrated satellite control system.
They down selected from four concepts. The options consisted of a system developed by
the Government (DCCS), a system of integrated COTS components (COBRA), a pure
commercial system (OS/COMET), and the existing shuttle mission control system. The
Air Force determined that all of the systems would have to undergo some level of
modification to fully meet requirements. It therefore chose to alter the system they were
developing, DCCS, even though the other three systems were already operational. The
DCCS system encountered design problems and was terminated in 1997. The commercial
variants, however, have continued to have successful implementations. O/SComet is used
to control the GPS satellites and COBRA controls three research satellites and has shown
an ability to control military satellites. The report additionally identified another
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commercial integrated satellite, SSC-21, which the Air Force is procuring for the SBIRS
program and a pure commercial satellite, Epoch 2000, that appear to meet all the Air
Force requirements. [Ref. 1 05 p. 8]
Army programs emphasized the ability of commercial firms to make minor
modifications of existing commercial products to meet the government need. Two of the
three programs used a commercial truck model as the baseline for production. The GAO
report asserted that the FMTV program used a commercial truck as a baseline as well, but
in its description identified it as a modified Austrian Army vehicle designed by Steyr-
Daimler-Puch AG the HETS and LET, however, required only minor modifications of
vehicles that the contractors produced commercially. Freightliner in fact did not have to
modify its vehicle at all to meet the primary and secondary requirements, but added an
additional axle to create an off road capability. [Ref. 105]
One pilot example consisted of a research and development contract with TRW's
Avionics Systems Division for the redesign of a military-unique product to be produced
on a commercial production line. The contractor succeeded in its performance objective.
The final product, a component for the F-22 met all longevity requirements except high
temperature endurance. The team thought however, that this ability would be resolved
with further test and analysis. The conversion expected a savings of 20% due to less
expensive materials and 20% from reduced administrative costs. The commercial line
produced 15,000 components a day, while the military only run was expected to produce
only hundreds of products per day. [Ref. 107 p. 4]
These reports showed a capability for commercial firms to enter the defense
industry with cost and technology advantages. The issue at hand, however, is whether
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they will. In the Satellite control system case, GAO reported that several private firms
offered to demonstrate their satellite control systems. [Ref. 104 p. 14] In the other
examples, however, Freightliner, Osh Kosh, Stewart Stevenson, and TRW all have
military divisions.
In an effort to attract more commercial involvement, DoD awarded 97 Section
845-Other Transaction Agreements (OTA) amounting to $2.1 Billion since 1993. These
OTAs allowed a relaxing of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) guidance, often touted
as the major barrier to commercial involvement in government acquisitions. A GAO
report surveying the 97 transactions found that 60% of the OTAs were designed
specifically to attract commercial involvement. Thirty-seven of the transactions were
specifically identified as part of the Commercial Operations and Support Savings
Initiative. This DoD initiative targets areas were commercial acquisitions have a potential
benefit for DoD. Of the 97 transactions 84 were with traditional defense firms and only
22 had non-traditional firms act as subcontractors.
The key players at this node are any commercial producer that has systems that
may be inserted directly into the defense system of systems. The GAO examples show
that commercial companies are viable competitors for future defense systems. The GAO
report on OTAs, however, shows that even with relaxed regulations, commercial
contractors are not willing to have a prime contractor relationship with DoD.
The Rules for this group of players are, therefore, that DoD must make it more
appealing for these firms to enter direct competition, or expect to use a traditional defense




Refuse to do business.
2. Create separate DoD divisions.
3. Use a traditional defense supplier to interface with DoD.
F. SUPPLIERS
The above discussion of dual use initiatives illustrates how DoD is attempting a
dramatic shift in the civil/military structure among defense producers. Two perspectives
of the prime contractors' supplier base show that at the second and third tier
subcontractor level civil military integration exists. The information systems and
electronic industries as we have stated above are primarily commercial. As early as 1992,
the Air Force realized that electronic components accounted for 40% of aircraft costs,
70% of air-launched missiles and 80% of satellite costs. [Ref. 104 p. 4] A 1991 study of
the Machining intensive Durable Goods (MDG) sector have shown a growth of
commercial dependence on traditional defense subcontractors. According to the study, the
durable goods accounted for 82.5% of DoD's manufactured goods procurement and the
MDG sector accounted for more than half of all durable goods purchased. [Ref. 52 p.
525]]
The semiconductor industry exemplifies DoD and the prime contractor's
influence as customers in the electronics sectors. Firms with the Standard Identification
Code of 3674 produce micro-electric, integrated circuits and semiconductors. The
industry sales in 1999 topped $149 Billion or almost 60% of DoD's 1999 Total
Obligation Authority (TOA) of $258 Billion. Personal Computers and communication
systems encompass over 50% of the end-use market for semiconductors. [Ref. 93] Major
companies in the Communications market estimated annual sales for 1999 to be between
$380 and $400 Billion. The firms additionally estimate the sales growth rate to range
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The production for the semiconductor industry reached over 93 % of capacity in the
fourth quarter of 1999. [Ref. 93] The combination of continued explosive growth and the
capacity limitations pose problems for DoD and its low margin arrangements.
The MDG sector survey had responses from plant managers in 973 plants in 21
industries. The survey revealed that of the 48.8% that had defense contracts, 80.4%
integrated their civil and military production. The report identified an increased
dependency on DoD contracts as the firms became larger and an even more significant
difference between those that held prime contracts and those that only subcontracted for
defense sales. The report summarized its data as follows:
In short, at the level of the plant, we find considerable integration between the
commercial and military industrial spheres in the MDG sector. Large multiplant firms
that do defense prime contracting tend to be slightly more dependent on DoD contracts
than are subcontractors. Overall, we find that defense production in the MDG sector
(whether directly for DoD or indirectly through subcontracts) usually takes place in
facilities in which the majority of shipments go to commercial customers. [Ref. 52 p.
525] Finally, the report showed that these firms were using innovation, and
diversification to add value to their business rather than economies of scale and quality
improvements.
The Players in this node are the second and third tier subcontractors. These firms
are the source of the innovation and improvements at the component level.
The Rules these firms are applying are really a reflection of independence from
the defense market. As economic conditions continue to be favorable, these firms are
finding revenue sources other than the traditional defense customers. The supplier's
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growing independence is reducing the value and leverage the defense firms and DoD
have in the relationship. These firms' future is in commercial market; they do not see an
advantage in working with DoD.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION OF THE INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
The data for this study come from 78 programs the literature review identifies as
the near term hosts for network centric warfare. A search of these programs in the
Infobase Publisher's Competitive Intelligence Website (infobasepub.com/main.html)
identified 92 prime contractor relationships for the development of these programs. With
the approval of the Defense Contract Management Agency, the program integrators and
administrative contracting officers, where identifiable for these relationships, were




Who is the prime contractor for the program in question?
2. What is the total dollar value of active contracts?
3. What is the percentage of performance (in terms of contract value) that the
prime contractor performs in lieu of subcontracting or purchase?
4. What is the nature of the primes performance (i.e. Integration and design




Where prime integrators were not identified or non responsive, the researcher
sought the same information from the respective Service program office or the Infobase
Publisher's Competitive Intelligence Website. The data collection resulted in identifying
the prime contractors and the total dollar value for active contracts for all the programs.
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However, it identified the percentage of prime performance for only 61 of the 92 prime
contractors producing the 78 programs.
This chapter presents the collected data on three levels: position, total revenue
stream, and value added in 1999. Position is prime contractor presence across the three
lobes of the network. A plot of presence identifies areas of expertise. The second level
focuses on total value of active contracts in each warfare mission. (Active contracts are
defined as contracts that the prime contractor is performing in August of 2000, which was
the month DCMA approved the survey.) The term "active contract" equates to a wide
performance period. Contracts that were awarded in the 1990's could still be open and
contracts awarded in 2000 would have up to 5 years of performance period left. This plot
shows degree of consolidation (or diversification). It identifies where DoD is expending
its resources in each warfare mission and which contractors are capturing those revenues.
The third and final level is the value added that a prime contractor provides to a specific
program in one fiscal year, 1999. The value added is calculated by multiplying the
FY1999 budget for a specific program by the percent of prime performance and then
subtracting the estimated prime profit. The profit is the firms* segment margin reported in
their 1999 annual reports. The 1999 budgets for each of the programs were taken from the
Department of Defense 1 999 Procurement and Research and Development Exhibit Books
P-l and R-l. Budget line items were attributed to the program only if it contained a direct
reference in the title. Service component budget books were referenced for the 25
programs that were not specifically mentioned in the P-l or R-l. The budget information
from the service components came from line items that either mentioned the program in
the title or had a categorical title and listed the program in a tabulated breakdown. Where
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available the value added plot adds useful detail to the total performance plot above. It
identifies where and to what extent the prime contractors are expending their resources to
capture the defense dollar.
B. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA
Prime Contractor Distribution for
Operational Maneuver From the Sea
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Figure 1 6 OMFTS Industry Concentration Developed by Researcher
In the OMFTS warfare mission, only five prime contractors show a significant
presence defined as having a prime contract for multiple programs in a single lobe, or at
least one contract in more than one lobe. The Boeing Company is the only prime
contractor that has prime contracts in all three lobes of this warfare mission. Boeing's C2
contract is the NAVSTAR GPS IIF program, obtained through acquiring Rockwell
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International Satellite & Space Defense Systems Division (Downey, CA). The sensor
programs are a departure from Boeing's more traditional base of aircraft and space
systems. These programs are the Zumwalt Class Destroyer DD-21 and the Long Term
Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS). Boeing is partnered with Litton Industries'
subsidiary Ingalls Shipbuilding in leading the Gold team in the competition for
development and design of DD-2 1 . The LMRS is an autonomous underwater vehicle
expected to seek out and report on mines in littoral waters. Boeing's presence in the
shooter lobe is as the prime for the V-22 and AH-1W programs, which is part of the
traditional role as aircraft producer. Lockheed Martin has multiple programs in both the
sensor and C2 lobes. Raytheon is heavily concentrated in the C2 lobe with four programs
and has one program, Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM), in the shooter
program. Northrop Grumman has four programs in only the sensor lobe. General
Dynamics and Litton have presence in multiple lobes due to acquisition of Bath Iron
Works, Electric Boat, and Ingalls Shipbuilding. Note that General Dynamics does have a
non-ship program in this warfare mission with the Advanced Amphibious Assault
Vehicle (AAAV). The ship programs are plotted on the chart according to their
acquisition strategy. The DD-21, DDG-51, NSSN, and LPD-17 programs are plotted in
multiple lobes because these programs identify a separate prime for the integration of
their warfare systems. The DD-21, DDG-51, and NSSN programs each have both a
sensor and shooter prime contractor, while LPD-17 has both a C2 and shooter contractor.
The LHD and SSN-21 programs do not have a separate prime for warfare systems
integration. They are plotted according to the researcher's judgment regarding their
primary function in the OMFTS mission. The LHD is plotted as a C2 unit while SSN is
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plotted as a sensor. Motorola is not considered to have a significant presence since it only
has one program in a single lobe. Its program, the common ground station, however, is
used in every warfare mission and is at the center of the open architecture and
interoperability debate.
DoD has active contracts for over $41 Billion attributed to the OMFTS warfare
mission. Northrop Grumman holds the highest percentage of active contract value with
over $9 Billion. Two thirds of the value is attributed to the JSTARS program. Lockheed
Martin, with ten programs in the C2 and Sensor lobes, has just over $8 Billion in active
contracts. $5.1 Billion of Lockheed's C2 revenues are due to the Advanced
MILSATCOM and MILSTAR satellite constellations. The Advanced MILSATCOM is
the planned replacement for the MILSTAR constellation starting in 2006. The acquisition
strategy for the Advanced MILSATCOM started as a competition between Lockheed
Martin, Hughes Space and Communications (now Boeing), and TRW. In November
1999, however, the three companies and the Air Force decided on a single team effort
lead by Lockheed Martin. [Ref. 86] The maintenance of the MILSTAR in conjunction
with the development of the replacement Advanced MILSATCOM, therefore, overstates
the revenue stream that Lockheed Martin would obtain for the long-term involvement in
the C2 function for this and all other warfare missions. The shipbuilders, General
Dynamics and Litton Industries follow closely behind with their capital-intensive
programs. Although Boeing has presence across the whole warfare mission, its active
contracts are only about half the value of Northrop's and Lockheed Martin's.
In 1999, $9 Billion of investment funds were obligated in support of 42 programs.
The value added calculations for OMFTS are skewed, primarily due to lack of prime
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performance data from ship producers. These omissions underreport the percentage of
performance added by General Dynamics, Litton Industries, and to some extend
Lockheed Martin and Boeing. The plot below shows how the individual primes
contributed to the development of OMFTS mission capability. In essence, thirty five
percent of investment in the OMFTS system of systems is attributed to the efforts of
Northrop Grumman. Although Boeing has only half of the total active contract value of
Lockheed Martin, the company has a comparable percentage of value added performance
in 1999. Datalink Solutions is a joint venture created by BAE Systems and Rockwell
Collins for the production of the MIDS FDL and MIDS LVT terminals. Although
Datalink Solutions is the technical prime, the entity does not add value other than to be a
clearinghouse for the partners.
















Figure 1 7 OMFTS Prime Performance Developed by Researcher
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C. THEATER AREA DEFENSE
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Figure 1 8 TAD Industry Concentration Developed by Researcher
Three prime contractors have significant presence by holding prime contracts in
all three lobes of this warfare mission. Lockheed Martin holds four sensor programs, five
C2 programs and five shooter programs. These programs range in diversity from satellite
communications and aircraft development to undersea sensors and ship communications.
Boeing's presence throughout this warfare mission is primarily a representation of its
traditional aircraft development expertise, exceptions being its DD-21 and NAVSTAR
involvement mentioned above. Raytheon's programs in the sensor and C2 lobes are
technology and software intensive programs. Its shooter programs are also traditional
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Raytheon programs in that the missiles are heavily dependant on inputs from Raytheon
developed C2 and Sensor programs. Northrop Grumman like in OMFTS has a
concentration of programs in the sensor lobe. TRW's involvement in TAD is limited to
one C2 program FAADC2I, a software intensive program, and their participation in the
Engineering Manufacture and Development (EMD) competition for the Space Based
Infrared System (SBIRS) Low program. Again, General Dynamics and Litton industries
have a significant presence in the shooter lobe due to their acquisitions of shipbuilders.
The active contracts for this warfare mission total $64.1 Billion. Lockheed Martin
and Boeing split 75% of the active contract, $26 Billion to Lockheed Martin and $21
Billion to Boeing. The next closest holders of the revenue share are the shipbuilders with
a combined value of $10 Billion. As a comparison, Raytheon with seven relatively
mature programs with presence in each of the lobes has only a slightly greater revenue
stream than Litton industries' two programs in only the shooter lobe. The DD-21 program
still being in the concept phase with only $168 Million in open contracts, compared to a
mature DD-51 program with $1.7 Billion, further accentuates the difference between
these firm's revenue streams.
Again, lack of shipbuilder performance data skews the data representation of
contractor value added. Thirty percent of DoD's 1999 budget for TAD related programs
were for development or production of ships. The remaining firm without performance
data, Digital Systems Resources, is the prime contractor for the SURTASS ship to shore
integration which accounts for less than one half of one percent of the 1 999 budget for
TAD mission related programs. Of the remaining DoD investment ($7.9 Billion), the six
prime contractors provided $2.5 Billion of value added performance. Boeing was the
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significant contributor to TAD in 1999 with 37% of the value added performance.
Lockheed Martin's multiple programs in all the mission functions and large total revenue
stream only provided 22% of the value added performance in 1999 compared to the 26%
value added contributed by Raytheon's C2 and Sensor associated programs. Northrop
Grumman's tight focus on sensor programs result in a small portion of the value added in
the TAD warfare mission.











Figure 19 TAD Prime Performance Developed by Researcher
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D. DOMINANT MANEUVER
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Figure 20 DM Industry Concentration Developed by Researcher
The prime contractors with significant positioning in dominant warfare are the
four major defense firms, plus TRW and UDLP. Boeing's presence reflects its traditional
expertise with air and space prime contracts. Lockheed Martin exploits its traditional
niche in development of C2 and sensor systems. Its presence in the shooter lobe comes
from leading the international development team competing for the Future Scout
program. Although Raytheon has a presence in all three lobes of the warfare mission,
with three C2 programs, its concentration is in technology-based programs. Raytheon
acquired its sole shooter program (ERGM) through the acquisition of Texas Instruments
Weapons Systems division. UDLP maintains its presence in this warfare mission through
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its tracked vehicle programs, Crusader and the Bradley family of vehicles. It is also
competing for the next generation sensor vehicle, Future Scout, by leading an
international development team. General Dynamics holds a presence in the shooter lobe
through the M1A2 and AAAV programs. General Dynamics is a contributing member to
Lockheed Martin's Future Scout team through a joint venture with Vickers Defence
Systems. Northrop Grumman' s key prime contracts for the JSTARS and Global Hawk
programs continue to give the company significant presence in the sensor lobe.
The active contracts for this warfare mission total $30.8 Billion. Boeing,
Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman share 73% of the revenue stream. In addition
to the overstatement of the revenue stream due to Lockheed's overlapping Satellite
programs, 50% ($670 Million) of its MLRS active contracts are attributed to direct
foreign sales to six countries since March of 1999. Boeing continues to maintain its
significant presence through its aircraft programs. Northrop's JSTARS and Global Hawk
programs maintain the company's position as a significant prime contractor in the sensor
lobe. UDLP is in a similar position to Lockheed Martin in that its vehicle programs are
in an overlap stage, albeit at a much smaller scale. The open contracts for the Family of
Bradley vehicles are for technology maintenance and the FCSC contracts are
comparatively small initial funding contracts for the competition between UDLP and
Lockheed Martin. TRW's Guardrail contract is one of the few instances were an
inconsistency exists between the 1999 budget data and either program integrator report or
the Infobase Publisher's database. The 1999 budget is for $62.3 Million, while the
Infobase database reports the active contracts to be only one million dollars. Although
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TRW shows a significant presence in terms of position, its revenue stream is less than
one half of one percent of the total warfare mission's active contracts.
The distribution of prime contractor value added for this warfare mission
identifies the cyclical nature of supporting warfare missions. Boeing and Northrop
Grumman's aircraft programs are in production. The Comanche program has just entered
the EMD phase of development with a $3.1 Billion contract and increased activity due to
the production of 13 aircraft for both EMD and operational testing. [Ref. 71] The
Longbow Apache is in mid production with the first upgraded AH-64's delivered in
1997. [Ref. 110] The AV-8B's are in the midst of a service life extension plan (SLEP).
Finally, the JSTARS program is in its Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase. These
upgrade and production activities account for almost 75% of the prime contractor value
added to this warfare mission. The unavailable data on General Dynamics' prime
contractor performance for the M1A2 Abrams prevents gathering supporting data from a
contractor in a similar situation. The MlA2 is currently going through an upgrade and the
AAAV is in the midst of its demonstration and validation phase with three production
models. The C2 core systems and combat vehicles for this mission, on the other hand, are
either experiencing low investment maintenance activity or initial analysis of alternative
investments shared between competitors. In 1999, Lockheed Martin and UDLP have a
combined value added of only 13%.
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Figure 2 1 DM Prime Performance Developed by Researcher
E. PRECISION STRIKE
The Precision Strike warfare mission is most referred to in network centric
discussions. Of all the warfare missions, precision strike is the closest to achieving a true
network structure. The industry data provided on this mission may provide the best
insight into adjustments to the new environment. First with twenty shooter programs,
DoD is investing in multiple ways to execute the mission. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and
Raytheon again have presence in all three functional lobes. Northrop still has a significant
presence in the sensor lobe and is also represented in the shooter lobe with the B-2.
Boeing adds missiles and guided munitions to its aircraft and space base. Four of
Boeing's programs in the shooter lobe are missiles or bombs that use information from
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aircraft or GPS in performance of their mission. Lockheed Martin's presence in the
sensor and shooter lobes mirrors the Boeing structure of aircraft and missile programs.
Prime Contractor Distribution for
Precision Strike
Boeing ;










3oei«g S Datairnk Solutions 2
Lockheed Martin 6
1 Shooters ^s^ I^X
Lockheed Martin 6
Newport News | C2 Motoroia Integrated Sys I
Northrop Grammar. ; \ 20 \ I Raytheon 5
Raytheon 17 J TRW 2
Figure 22 PS Industry Concentration Developed by Researcher
Lockheed again maintains a strong presence in space based C2 programs. The shooter
lobe is the only warfare mission where Raytheon has a significant presence. Raytheon has
four missile programs. Additionally, Raytheon is represented in the C2 lobe with its sole
aircraft prime contract, Rivet Joint.
The total active contracts for this warfare mission equal S64 Billion. SI 6.7 Billion
of this value is attributed to direct or Foreign Military Sales of the F-16. Half of
Lockheed Martin's active contract value in this warfare mission is attributed to foreign
sales of the F-16. The F-16 contract sales are comparable to Boeing's, the second largest
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firm in this warfare mission, with total active contracts at $17 Billion. Northrop
Grumman's S6 Billion JSTARS program is bolstered by the $4 Billion of active B-2
contracts and give the company claim to 19% of the revenue stream. Raytheon again,
despite a significant amount ofprogram presence, has less than 5% of the revenue stream.
The value added data is skewed due to insufficient prime contractor performance
data on key programs. Also, Joint Strike Fighter data is source selection sensitive and
thus unavailable.
1999 Value Added to Precision Strike
Warfare Mission
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Figure 23 PS Prime Performance Developed by Researcher
Other unavailable key elements concern the F/A-18 E/F program, the CVN-77, and
ATACMS. These absences appear to cause an understatement of the value added
performance by both Boeing and Lockheed Martin. With S3.2 Billion of 1999's budget
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associated with Boeing's F/A-18 E/F, the understatement of Boeing's position is much
greater than that of Lockheed Martin's. Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman have
comparable percentages of the prime contractor value in 1999. An adjustment of
Boeing's value for the absent data would put it on the same level as Lockheed Martin and
Northrop. Raytheon with less than 2% of the available revenues applied 14% of the value
added performance in 1999.
F. INDUSTRY ANNUAL REPORTS
This section reviews the annual reports for the four largest firms. The review
focuses the firm's current strategy through the CEO's comments and heralded
achievements in their letter to the shareholders and business report.
1. The Boeing Company
Boeing's letter to the shareholders depicts a company intent on creating
shareholder wealth through exploiting its integration skills and expertise. The report
states, "In a year filled with big events and changes, one of the biggest was this: We
stopped thinking of ourselves as just an aerospace manufacturer and began to think of
ourselves in a much broader way as a provider of integrated products and services to all
of our customers." [Ref. 7 p. 3] The report credits the company's integration skills and
state of the art assembly processes with winning major space and defense contract
competitions in 1999. [Ref. 7 p. 2] In closing, the report states that the company expects
to improve its strategic position through continued refinement of existing process and
moving into new growth markets.
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2. Lockheed Martin Corporation
Lockheed Martin's letter to shareholders focuses on accomplishments and the
company's plan to reduce debt. The plan states that the company will focus on its core
competencies, which are Aircraft, Space Systems and Integration Services. The systems
integration segment witnessed a 9% increase in its order backlog, reaching $15 billion.
This backlog is the highest of any of the company's business units. The report stated that
the increase were due to 50% increases in missile integration contracts and 50% platform
integration services. [Ref. 59 p. 25]
In a speech before the Atlantic Council and the Center for European Reform Mr.
Vance Coffman, CEO of Lockheed Martin gave a summation of his view of the defense
industry. He stated,
Our "market" is driven by military requirements, and our products are
intimately tied to the directions that NATO and Allied militaries wish to
go in the future. That future will increasingly be one of information-based
strategies, including networks that link "sensors and shooters," integration
of ever-more-complex systems, and delivery of all this information to the
commanders who need it, whether in national decision making centers, in
cockpits, or on the battlefield itself. In other words, the provision of
integrated systems of sensors, platforms, weapons and knowledge - so-
called network-centric solutions - will be key products of our industry
[Ref. 18]
3. Northrop Grumman Corporation
Northrop Grumman' s CEO, Kent Kresa, opens his letter to the shareholders with a
discussion of the revolution of military affairs. He further states that Northrop has been
positioning itself for competing in a network centric defense environment. The letter to
shareholders discusses two specific requirements, sensor technologies and Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In this discussion, Mr. Kresa mentions prime integration
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capabilities and key subcontracts for the F-16 program (sensor contract) and the F/A-18
E/F program (aero structures contract). The company's report on Logicon, its information
services segment, indicates pursuit of both a strong subcontractor base to leverage its
prime contracts, as well as diversification. Logicon is a key subcontractor for the Aegis
system, and holds complementary contracts for support services to the warfare centers.
Additionally, it is using its information systems core strength to capture economies of
scale through business in both state services and health care sectors. Northrop Grumman
is creating similar synergies in its other sectors. Its Electronic Sensors and Systems
Sector is a subcontractor for both the gold and blue teams on the DD-21 contract and the
company is championing its JSTARS and E-2C Hawkeye contracts as indications of
things to come.
4. Raytheon Company
Raytheon's letter to shareholders focused on a disappointing year in 1999 and a
commitment to remain as the leader in defense electronics. The company has reorganized
by teaming its defense electronic sectors producing commercially marketable products
with the rest of its commercial sector. The company intends to build on its existing
relationship with DoD to create synergies with commercial sales, plus innovation in
optics and RF technology. The company reports its strength to be a pioneer in data fusion
technology and network centric command and control systems. It will use this strength to
capture the upgrades of existing platforms to meet the network centric requirement.
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G. INDUSTRY SUMMARY
The key players in the industry for network centric warfare are the four largest
firms. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman have significant
presence in every warfare mission. Except for OMFTS, they have captured greater than
70% of the revenue stream for each of the warfare missions. Their combined value added
performance is greater than 70% for every warfare mission; in the cases of Precision
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Figure 24 Prime Concentration by Mission Function Developed by Researcher
The firms are establishing positions across each of the warfare missions.
Lockheed Martin and Boeing are expanding to non-traditional platforms through
technology integration contracts. The smaller producers that have established niche
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markets in shipbuilding, sensor development and armored vehicles are teaming with these
players to maintain their presence in the industry.
The Rules for the industry are those established by DoD.
Technology capture and interoperability.
For the most part the key players in industry are responding to DoD's push for
competition at the component level by leaving the segment. The firms are doing less
component building and more component integration. They are funding joint projects
with dual use firms and leveraging the resulting innovations. This Tactic is being
employed by three of the four firms. Raytheon is still holding on to its electronics
excellence as a competitive tool and challenging commercial component builders with
abilities in specialization markets. Another Tactic employed is the staking of claims. The
firms are capturing system presence that is potentially advantageous when the
competition for plug and fight interoperability matures. Any such advantage rests on
ability to solve the future problem of interoperability and coupling of system architecture
with operational doctrine.
The scope of the relationship between DoD and the industry is divided into three
parts in accordance with the levels of architecture. At the top level, platform structure.
scope is reduced except for potential growth in international sales. The middle level or
the architecture development has tremendous potential for growth, since the
interoperability requirement requires adjustments to methods of doctrine and system
coupling. The lowest level, components, has tremendous growth due to the short life
cycle of the technologies. It also has potential for considerable competition growth and
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instability (From a firm's perspective) as COTS and Open Systems architecture practices
take hold
H. DATA PRESENTATION SUMMARY
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Figure 25 Value Net Forces Recap Developed by Researcher
The complexity of the influences on the traditional defense industry creates a
daunting problem for those seeking to clarify the picture without diluting the robustness
of the data. The industry data and, in particular, the strategic statements in the 1 999
annual reports indicate that the key players are reacting to DoD's signals. The firms are
structuring themselves for competition at the system of systems level. They are
developing synergies between platform development and information systems
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technologies. The international market poses a potential for growth, as well as a threat of
new entrant competition. Additionally, the firms hope to leverage commercial
technologies into economies of scale. Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman
seek to apply their integration skills in new markets. Raytheon intends on competing with
the commercial technology market with its electronics component capabilities. The
competition at the integration level gives the supplier base increased value especially in
the electronic technology sector where capacity is limited and demand growth
unprecedented. Finally and most importantly, the shift to open architecture systems and
the reduced scale of platform structures is forcing the competition between systems to the





















Figure 26 DoD Value Chain Developed by Researcher
The analysis of the industry starts with a general view of the Value Chain for
successful network centric operations. DoD's many visionary documents have two
common themes. The force of the future will rely on its networked abilities and
technological advancements will enable the transformation to the future force. The
5000.2 and dual use program guidlines establish that the transformation will be an
iterative process. The emphasis on technology insertion and rapid evolution define the
foundation levels of the value chain. The remainder of the chain rests on the integration
process either at the weapon system or system of systems level. This value chain is a
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broadband look at the value builders for system of systems production. Inside each of
these arrows, one would find the industry firms using strategic mechanisms such as low
cost, economies of scale, or product differentiation to build their value to the chain. The
performance and position a firm establishes in the industry dictates its ability to
strategically compete along the value chain. The data have shown there is a strong link
between a firm's prime contracts and its strategic plan. The industry analysis identifies
where the key firms are attempting to create value and where there is opportunity for
competitive advantage. Finally, as a cautionary note, the leap from system of systems
integration to warfare success does not mean interoperable systems are sufficient for
warfare success. Corporate system of systems integration does not include strategic
planning, operational skill, and systems interoperability. The Value produced by the
Industry development of systems can only speak to the interoperability of the systems and
their ability to meet the requirements of DoD's warfare doctrine. The strategic and
operational value of the system of systems employment rests solely on DoD's warfare
planners.
The next step of the analysis is to determine which portions of the value chain
have the greatest importance for the key players in the industry. This research focuses on
the rules and tactics of the key players to determine where they are placing value. For
instance, the key players in DoD have used the performance specification and open
systems tactics to eliminate proprietary claims to technology and component
development. DoD is, therefore, placing a higher value on rapidly inserting advanced
technology and components than on design to specifications or discrete technologies.
Starting with DoD's influences, this chapter layers the value building or restricting
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requirements each external node of the value-net places on the network centric warfare
value chain. The final picture of the value chain points out the strategic environment
within which the key players of the industry must compete.
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Figure 27 DoD Influences Analysis Developed by Researcher
1. Technology Innovation and Component Development
Innovation rapidly converted into an application creates the most value at this
phase of network centric warfare's production. DoD, however, cannot fund R&D at the
required levels to support an in-house capability robust enough to match the speed with
which innovation occurs in the commercial sector. DoD is resolving this mismatch by
attracting commercial firms, with their R&D resources and large scale production, to
enter the innovation and component development market. The shift to performance
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specifications, open architecture and the revised plan for major systems procurement
detaches the source of technology innovation from the program manager and proprietary
designs controlled by the prime contractor. This reduced control promotes the entrance of
commercial firms as competitors for the lower levels of weapons systems development.
It also provides an opportunity for those primes with subcontract management skills and
capital to create the necessary alliances for successful technology insertions. Those prime
contractors that desire to continue making defense systems from the component level up
must build a commercial outlet for their components. They must obtain the economies of
scale for their R&D and production to maintain a Maximum Efficiency Scale comparable
to the commercial sector. The researcher bases this opinion on the scale of the
commercial communications and semiconductor markets versus the DoD market for the
same products. By removing the proprietary protection on systems that require these
components, DoD is giving the firms that choose integrating commercial technologies
over building their own at least a cost advantage, if not a technology edge.
Tapping into commercial technology creates an access to the commercial products
that emanate from the research. To reconfigure the commercial technology into a defense
specific product would be to lose the economies of scale created by commercial
production. As shown by the TRW pilot production case, a production line producing
1500 units would have a much greater economy of scale than a run of a two hundred. In
essence, DoD is seeking to capture technology and components with only a 36-month life
cycle. Rather than invest in custom design technologies that are susceptible to
obsolescence, DoD would rather make incremental investments on open technologies that
are upgradeable. This fact ties in with the Defense Science Board on Vertical Integrations
92
finding that; "Continuous change in missions and technologies for defense systems makes
fixed, in-house investments in supply (component or subsystem) subsidiaries risky". [Ref
32 p. 26] Additionally, the DoD Directive 5000.2 requires that the concept technologies
be tested and mature before their implementation into system development and
production projects. The use of commercially applied technology satisfies this
requirement without additional testing and validation.
2. System Design and Production
There are two major aspects for these levels of warfare development. First, the
"constrained budget" and "no peer competitor" environment signals reduced production
lines for capital assets. DoD values a smaller more lethal force, which they will produce
through recapitalization programs and technological evolution. Second, the system
design has architecture implications for system components and for operational
requirements. The tight coupling between system architecture and operational doctrine is
a significant source of value for the prime integrator. This raises the importance of
weapon systems contracts beyond the expected production quantity.
The testimony concerning Army recapitalization, the numerous service life
extension programs and the policy statement stressing value created by upgrading
information dominance systems vice building new platforms are signals for reduced
production lines. Internal efficiencies such as the consolidation of the early 1990's, the
use of acceptable COTS components and the sharing of R&D costs will reduce the
Maximum Efficient Scale (MES) of platform production, however, It is these are enough
to compensate for reduced demand. Both Production rates and the number of different
systems are shrinking. The Joint Strike Fighter with its multiple configurations is
intended to replace fighters, attack, and Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) aircraft. It
is touted as the last major aircraft production for years to come. If the prime contractor
desires to hold on to large production facilities as a core competency, it must be ready to
support the infrastructure with non-DoD work.
The systems development level of the value chain is where open architecture
requirements meet operational demands. The conflicts that brought about the CEC
Integration Task Force suggest a widespread coupling of doctrine and system architecture
through the software code as a solution. This fusion of doctrine into design creates a
proprietary connection to the systems architecture. As a result, prime integration contracts
have significance beyond their potential revenue stream. The program's value to the
entire network creates complementary attributes for the production of both system
upgrades and complementary systems in the network.
The Joint Technical Architecture initiative has successfully promoted use of
commercial technologies developed in the concept stage, and rewards designs that
insulate components from the system architecture as in the F-22 design. As a result,
growing use of open systems architecture, COTS components, and commercial R&D is
effectively isolating the component level from the platform architecture or achieving plug
and play capabilities. This modular design, however, separates the prime contractor from
future revenues tied to incremental performance increases made at the component level.
A fully isolated component system means that upgraded components would be
universally compatible and require zero changes to the total system for insertion. Ideally,
DoD would be able to purchase an upgraded unit for the F-22 direct from the component
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producer and install it without requiring prime contractor involvement. The fusion of
doctrine and systems architecture, however, prevents this from occurring.
The increase in component capacity created by the technology advancement,
however, is an opportunity for process improvement. It's in DoD's interest to change
processes and operational architecture to capitalize on technology enhancements. The
desired changes in process affect the marriage between doctrine and architecture.
Enhancements to architecture are strictly in the domain of the prime contractor. The
proprietary software code addresses more than the presentation and transfer of the
battlespace and system information, but also the content and the human and system
reaction to the information. The faster processing enabled by technology upgrades creates
a natural demand for more content. The definition of the new content and how the system
would obtain or process it requires changes to the systems architecture software. This
additionally must be coordinated with the user who will dictate what additional content
adds value to the system. Therefore, proprietary systems architecture is a natural barrier
to entry for upgrade competitions. The prime contractor, who captures the initial
development contract for a weapon system, has a distinct advantage through its
knowledge of the link between doctrine and system architecture. Through its proprietary
knowledge, the prime will have the integration responsibility for all subsequent
technology refreshments.
3. System of Systems Development
The prime contractor's control over the systems architecture/doctrine fusion has a
direct impact on the interoperability requirements put in place by the 5000.2, CJCSI
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3170.A1, and the 6212. IB. The researcher suggests that since it took a task force of 300
personnel to recommend changes to the Aegis Advanced Combat Directional Systems
(ACDS) and Command and Control Processor (C2P) systems to allow their successful
linking through CEC, meeting interoperability requirements defense wide is the new
market for prime contractors. The Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon
suggests there are economies of scale in architecture development. In a brief to the eighth
PEO/SYSCOMS Commander's conference, Ms. Linda Northrop, Director of their
Product Line Systems Program, stated that the architecture development processes are
easily reused across similar requirements or product lines. [Ref. 72] Integrating firms can
convert core competencies through engineering knowledge, system experience, test plans
and documentation competitive advantage, in interoperability
C. SUPPLIERS AND COMMERCIAL FIRMS
In his paper on the history of dual use technology, Mr. Jay Stowsky suggested that
the dual use initiatives of the 1990's gave the traditional defense firms cause for alarm. A
General Accounting Office analysis of section 845 other transactions and a review of
active dual use technology contracts prove otherwise. The very low percentage of
commercial firms acting as prime contractors in either program indicates that the firm's
are not actively competing with traditional defense firms. Whether it is due to profit
incentive (5.4% average return on Aero/Defense revenues, 14.2% return on Network
system revenues, 9.4% on Communications equipment revenues) [Ref. 94] or an aversion
to Federal Acquisition Regulation, the commercial firms would prefer to subcontract
through a defense company than work directly for the Government. This fact has strategic
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make or buy implications that hinge on the cost versus control issue. By scaling back the
in-house component or sub assembly development capabilities and relying on
commercial suppliers for technology advancement the prime saves considerable
infrastructure costs. Its versatility and speed as a developer rests on its ability to
recognize innovative producers and integrate the new technology with their processes.
The price for the flexibility and potential infrastructure reduction is the loss of proprietary
control of the technology. As was shown in the semiconductor markets, the commercial
demand for technology products is outpacing supply. Without an in-house production



































Figure 28 Commercial and Supplier Influences Developed by Researcher
As stated above, the involvement of the commercial firms and suppliers have
accelerated the conversion to open systems type architecture. Again, the compatibility of
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hardware systems has not eliminated the primes proprietary barrier created by the
doctrine/systems architecture fusion. In this regard, even if the commercial firms desired
to compete for prime integration contracts they would have a steep learning curve in
terms of defense doctrine.


























Reduced # of upgradeable
Platforms
Interoperability, Architecture,


















Figure 29 International Influences Analysis Developed by Researcher
1. Technology Innovation and Component Development
The traditional defense firm's decision to build components in-house or
subcontract determines the impact of international suppliers on their strategic position.
Subcontracting again shows more strategic promise. First, it increases the number of
potential suppliers. Second, the subcontracts are sources of offset compensation
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increasing the desirability for the prime's product. The historical presence of co-
development and joint ventures across the Atlantic is evidence of the feasibility of
inserting foreign developed components. The increased international activity at the
component level suits the COTS and technology insertion model. The prime contractors
who choose to subcontract vice develop benefit from competition-induced pricing and
innovation. The ability of a firm to create an offset out of component developments will
additionally, meet a Foreign Military Sales need without diluting proprietary capabilities.
2. System Design and Production
Foreign sales is a way a firm may compensate for the reduced U.S. arms purchase
and maintain their MES for production. With Foreign Military Sales (FMS) toping $12
Billion in 2000 and the allied defense budgets on the rise, there is growth potential in the
foreign markets. Lockheed Martin doubled its production of F-16s due to FMS. Overseas
sales is consistently a proven market, the question is how much can be sold and will it be
enough to maintain production lines. The U.S. military owns almost 50% of all armament
systems in the world. Depending on type of system, a mix of five allied nations own
another 25% of the world's armaments. The rest of the world shares the remaining 25%.
The U.S. industry is perhaps the largest producer of arms, but it is not the only producer.
It must compete for sales in a market with buys on a much smaller scale than their
domestic production. The European industry is seeking to capture some of the market,
and the trend for nationalistic motives among the biggest foreign buyers provides a
competitive leveling if not an advantage.
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3. System of Systems Development
The push for coalition interoperability is a distinct competitive advantage in the
race for Allied recapitalization. As stated above the U.S. has almost half of the
armaments in the world, and stands to be the key player in all Coalition responses to
aggression. It would follow, therefore, that the U.S. architecture would set the
interoperability standard. Both Dr. Gansler and Mr. Coffman, CEO of Lockheed Martin
have expressed similar opinions when speaking to Trans-Atlantic organizations. Since,
U.S. firms are able to build a competitive advantage through the proprietary fusion
between architecture and doctrine, expanding the interoperability requirement beyond
U.S. borders only increases those advantages. Lockheed Martin has shown that the firms
may expand the interoperability base without extending their production capability. They
have established an architectural foothold through their integrated warfare systems
contract on the Norwegian's new fleet of frigates. While foreign suppliers have the
contract for the ship development. The growing demand for interoperability paves the
way for a growth in similar arrangements.
E. SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
1. Technology Innovation and Component Development
DoD's plans for iterative movement towards exploiting the revolution of military
affairs. This policy favors technological refreshments of contemporary systems, which
implies a market whose cycle matches the 36-month life cycle of component technology.
The refreshment of both domestic and Allied system components promises market
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The refreshment of both domestic and Allied system components promises market
growth at the lowest level of warfare development. Weapon system producers look
favorably upon signals such as Admiral Cebrowski's labeling technology as a
commodity. [Ref. 13] The traditional defense firms, however, must decide if their core
business enables competition against commercial firms with R&D capital and revenues
that dwarf the defense industry's. Overhead burdened defense firms with small-scale
production cannot compete on a unit cost basis with the commercial technology
producers. If a traditional defense firm decides to compete, it must either expand its
commercial market presence, achieve the economies of scale or differentiate its product
























































Figure 30 Summary of Influences Analysis Developed by Researcher
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2. System Development and Production
The system development and production level is the bridge between the fast-
paced component market and the "potentially growing" interoperability market. The
strength of the bond between operational doctrine and systems architecture defines the
industry's survivability. This level gives the prime contractor a protected foothold in the
technology refreshment market. To rely on this foothold based on architecture changes to
meet evolutionary changes is a defensive strategy. As with component isolation,
technology will eventually break the fusion between doctrine and architecture code.
Additionally, the network centric revolution is driving nations to smaller, more lethal
forces. This means that although there is an increase in defense spending, the trend for
smaller forces will eventually shorten the production cycles. To compete for weapons
system production lines is to proverbially, "slice up a shrinking pie". In order to stay in
this market, industry players must find ways to fill capacity or increase the value of their
production assets.
3. System of Systems Development
The signals from DoD key players indicate that interoperability is a growth
market. Strength of networks depends on the number of connected nodes. To connect a
single battle group required a great effort on the part of government and industry
officials. The task involved marrying architectures based on naval doctrine. With the
added requirement of marrying doctrines from the remaining services, and then allied
operations, the complexity becomes daunting. The traditional defense industry firms have
an advantage because of their intimate knowledge of the system architecture/doctrine
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fusion. Additionally, as indicated by the software engineering institute, the firms gain an
economic advantage by increasing involvement in platform integration projects. Firms
with significant presence across a warfare mission's three function lobes have an
unprecedented advantage in interoperability competition.
F. INDUSTRY REACTION
1. Introduction
This section of the analysis looks at the strategic position of the four key players
of the network centric industry. It attempts to translate the positions and performance of
Boeing
,
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon, into a description of
strategic intent. This section additionally, highlights and delves into corporate departures
from their emerging strategy or uncharacteristic changes in product mix made to achieve
the strategy. The discussion addresses the firms individually.
2. The Boeing Company
The Boeing Company's 1999 annual report identified its emergence as a company
whose core competency is integrating complex systems. Average prime contract
performance of 53% and the characterization of performance on seven of the nine such
projects were identified as "integration and design". The company has strong commercial
representation in aircraft and space systems development through their commercial
aircraft products and their acquisition of Hughes and Rockwell Space Systems. These
general characteristics suggest the company is targeting the system development and
production market. Their performance across the value chain and presence across the
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warfare missions, however, suggest that Boeing's strategy goes beyond the maturing
systems development and production market.
Boeing is clearly outsourcing its component development tasks. Only the F-15E,
Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) and the fuselage development for
the AV-8B are categorized as component development contracts. The remaining contracts
are categorized as integration and design. (The researcher must note here that he and the
prime integrators at the Defense Contract Management Centers (DCMCs) considered
assembly of the final system as part of "integration and design".) Boeing's involvement
in the Dual Use Science and Technology program further illustrates this preference for
architecture design over hardware development. Boeing develops designs or validates
requirements in four of their five awarded projects.
If Boeing's strategy is to concentrate on the system development market, it should
be concentrating in aircraft and satellite programs where its commercial economies
provide a distinct advantage. Boeing's movement into the combat systems architecture
for the DD-2 1 and the development of the Long Term Mine Reconnaissance System, are
signals of an alternate strategy. Boeing's aircraft and missile contracts give them presence
in shooter lobes across all the warfare missions and in each of the services. The AWACS
program, however, provides sensor presence in only the land based warfare missions. The
DD-21 and LMRS contracts provide the needed access to the sensor to shooter linkage in
naval operations. The NAVSTAR program is a misleading presence indicator. It is only a
single program, but GPS guidance affects every program listed on the matrix.
Additionally, the recently acquired Hughes Space Systems has tremendous presence in
satellite communications at the subcontract level. These actions demonstrate that Boeing
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is expanding its knowledge of doctrine influencing interoperable systems architecture.
This is a strategy for a knowledge base a development of economies of scale for system
of systems production and a competitive edge for interoperability integration contracts.
3. Lockheed Martin Corporation
Lockheed Martin's vision statements, CEO representations, and corporate
structure indicate that the firm concentrates on integration capabilities over component
development. The firm's performance on prime contracts is 54%. The prime integrators
categorized eight of the twelve contracts reported as integration and design. The
remaining programs were categorized as C2 component development contracts. Lockheed
Martin's performance on these four contracts averaged 80%. The firm has additionally
established a commercial outlet for information technology through their L3 spin-off, of
which they own 35%. Foreign sales are the firm's only economy of scale builder for their
system development and production market. They have demonstrated a proficiency in
developing foreign sales through their F-16 program. Additionally, Airbus's presence on
the JSF team opens the door to further European sales. Although this general structure of
the company appears to align them for achieving market advantage in weapon systems
sales, it does not fit the maturing environment for this market. Lockheed's presence in the
warfare mission and percentage of 1999 value demonstrate a stronger view towards
capturing the growing interoperability market. The firm has only 5% value added in the
dominant maneuver warfare mission while it averages 25% in the remaining three. The
researcher believes this is the reason Lockheed Martin is competing for a land vehicle
program. The uncharacteristic development of the Future Scout program gives them
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access to the shooter lobe of the dominant maneuver mission, which completes their
sensor to shooter presence.
Finally, it appears Lockheed Martin is going a step beyond Boeing in
trying to build a knowledge base for interoperable production. It has successfully gained a
foothold in the development of the system architectures in the European theater through
the Norwegian contract. Additionally, through the JSF interoperability test site in Texas,
it has successfully advertised its capabilities for testing interoperable systems. The firm is
tailoring the capabilities the Software Engineering Institute suggested as critical for
systems development into a system of systems production expertise.
4. Northrop Grumman Corporation
The performance and position of Northrop Grumman as a network centric warfare
producer indicate it as a crossover company. The company's 56% prime performance,
which is predominantly categorized as "integration and design", indicates that the firm is
targeting systems architecture like Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Northrop departs from
their strategy, however, by clearly concentrating in the sensor lobe and unmanned vehicle
development. This strategy has merit; the information superiority requirement places a
high value on the sensor lobe. With just six programs, (five sensors) the firm produced on
average 28% of the value added for network centric warfare missions in 1999. Northrop
Grumman's unmanned vehicle experience extends beyond their acquisition of Teledyne
Ryan. The firm holds the Near Term Mine Reconnaissance System contract and is a
major subcontractor for its replacement, Boeing's LMRS contract. To complete
Northrop's expertise in unmanned sensor systems, the company acquired Logicon Inc. for
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its data management assets. Through this acquisition, it now has an information systems
arm with access to commercial economies that provides solutions for the presentation of
the large amounts of data its systems promise to collect. If you classify Boeing and
Lockheed Martin's tactics as acquiring generalist knowledge for total system
management, Northrop is seeking a specialist's role in sensor architecture and doctrine
marriage.
5. Raytheon Company
Raytheon is the only key player that has not left the component development
model. Although the firm shows an average of only 56% prime performance across the
warfare missions, nine of its twelve programs are characterized as "component
development". Of the nine, seven are categorized as C2 development. The firm
additionally established a commercial outlet for its component production and R&D.
Raytheon's prime contract holdings are closely tied to its component and software
strengths. Its value added performance is low in the DM and OMFTS warfare missions.
Its performance in TAD and PS missions is moderate at 15 to 20%. Raytheon's strategy
as a prime contractor appears to be two pronged. First, it is capturing prime contracts
such as missiles, the Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM), and the Joint Tactical
Radio System. These systems exploit Raytheon's ability to create hardened micro-
electronic systems. The second prong attempts to capture a C2 architecture foothold
similar to Northrop Grumman's in Sensors. The company has three programs (CEC,
Patriot Pac III, LPD-17 IWS) that are key C2 elements for the OMFTS and TAD warfare
missions.
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A note on the Patriot PAC III, although the system is listed as a shooter,
Raytheon's prime contractor performance is categorized as C2 development and
integration. In the researcher's opinion, Raytheon's strategy places it a the follow the
leader position for both prongs. In the component development track, the company has an
exploitable niche, but is behind its commercial competitors in establishing economies of
scale. In the C2 specialty, the firm is behind Lockheed Martin (which has a strong C2
capability supported by its interoperability economies.)
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Figure 3 1 Industry Plot Developed by Researcher
Using a version of a market share plot, the researcher plotted the firms according
to their position in the industry developing network centric warfare. Along the bottom of
the chart are the three phases of the system of sytems value chain. The environmental
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conditions at each phase are summarized in terms of market potential and level of
competition. These are listed across the top of the plot.
The positioning of Boeing and Lockheed Martin suggests intense competition
between the two firms. Both Firms appear to be using the same strategy. They are
exploiting their design and integration abilities to expand system development presence
across warfare missions. Their expansion is aimed at building an exploitable position for
interoperability requirements. The researcher suggests that the difference between current
conditions and where DoD leaders desire to be has more employment then these two
companies can provide. Additionally, no other firms appear to have a near term capability
to match theirs. Raytheon appears to have established a niche capability in a growth area
by building integral components for Shooter and C2 systems. The niche, however, is a
difficult position. The growth market at the component level is experiencing high
competition due to the entrance of commercial firms with much larger R&D resources
and economies of scale. Raytheon's component development skills have less value than
interoperability production capabilities. It must compete against Boeing and Lockheed
Martin's interoperability economies for fewer system development contracts. Therefore,
competitive advantage from the right and the left of the plot will continue to increase
market pressure on the Raytheon. Northrop Grumman has identified a solid niche in two
highly valued areas of network centric warfare. By managing relationships with Boeing
and Lockheed Martin, the firm is likely to protect its sensor niche and expand on its
Unmanned Vehicle expertise.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this thesis was to establish a view of the DoD/industry
relationship from the network centric warfare perspective. At the core of this perspective
is the understanding that an integrated system of systems is the relevant market for
traditional defense firms. This study applied a business model that framed the relationship
in terms of complementary and competitive forces. Through this application, the study
hoped to decipher the strategic intent of the industry's key players. It additionally hoped
to validate the model's value and the importance of analyzing the industry in terms of the
system of systems instead of platform development capability.
The value net model provides an excellent framework for organizing the
influences on the relationship. Breaking the relationships down into groups of key
players, rules, and tactics focused the research on significant factors affecting the
relationship. The resultant sketch, although a simplification of many very complex
entities, appears to capture a valid view of the essence and salient points of the
relationship.
The data collected adequately supported the thesis' attempt to track the industry's
movements towards capturing the network centric market. There are, however,
shortcomings to the data set. First, the selection of the 78 programs was based on an
outsider's view of the DoD's requirements process. The literature review provided an
assessment of what the DoD's requirements officers are planning. It did not provide
definitive statements as to the future systems of network centric warfare. In the
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researcher's view the list has enough key programs to provide a sense of the requirement,
it does not, however, provide a detailed or robust definition. Second, the unavailable data
on prime contractor performance created underestimates in the value added calculation.
Again, enough information was provided to garner a sense of the industry's intention, but
a detailed accounting was not obtainable. Lastly, the analysis of the prime contractor's
1999 performance is a snap shot view. This analysis, although valuable, would have
created a richer understanding of the industry if it were applied to earlier years and
suggested strategic trends. The view of performance over time would have reduced the
effect of the investment and production cycles attributed to weapon systems procurement.
These refinement issues aside, this thesis did validate the Value Net model as a
tool for understanding complex industry relationships. It additionally identified broad
market environment characteristics that are influencing the corporate strategies in the
defense industry. It is apparent that Government and commercial forces are creating a
growth market at the component level while simultaneously increasing the competition.
Only one key industry player is indicating a desire to remain a competitor at this level.
The platform or weapon system development market is maturing and gaining new
entrants. This is creating stiffer competitions for smaller product lines. The product lines
do not appear to be the value producer for this level of network centric warfare
development. The close coupling of system architecture and operational doctrine is the
key barrier to entry for the technology refreshment and interoperability markets. The key
players will therefore remain active at this level as the attempt to leverage their
involvement in the other two growing markets. Finally, the interoperability market has
tremendous growth potential, with only two firms, Boeing and Lockheed Martin,
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positioning themselves for general management roles. The last key player, Northrop
Grumman, is establishing differentiation and niche market ability in the sensor lobe of the
market.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1. Recommendation #1
Conduct further studies assessing the Industrial Base in terms of network
centric production capability with the Value-Net model.
This study identified valid points that suggest the traditional defense industry has
identified the complementary value of linked weapon systems. They appear to be
positioning themselves to use this value to increase their competitive advantage in
satisfying DoD's requirements for technology refreshment and interoperability. The
industry, therefore, should be analyzed by its production of network centric warfare
mission capability instead of platform production capability. An analysis at this level will
capture the complementary linkages and reveal potential attempts of foreclosure or
forward integration.
2. Recommendation #2
Make a concerted effort to collect data that support Value Net Analysis.
The percentage of prime contractor performance is not centrally maintained and
often difficult to gather. These data have relevance to the Value Chain analysis, which is
pertinent to evaluations for new procurements and upgrade contracts. The data provide an
insight into the importance of the prime involvement on the program. It may signal
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opportunities for component breakouts or possible second sourcing. The compilation of
the value chain data certainly provides a different view of the defense industry's viability.
It has signaled to the researcher that certain firms are not going to fold if they lose the
next aircraft contract. The researcher recommends DoD make a concerted effort to
centralize data applicable to prime contractor performance.
3. Recommendation #3
Incorporate Value Net methods into market analysis training curricula for
the DoD work force.
Both the Priced Based Acquisition report of December 1999 and the Defense
Science Board Report on Vertical Integration and Supplier Decisions recommended that
DoD personnel improve their industry and market analysis skills. The Value Net model is
an excellent tool DoD personnel may use to improve their insights of industry situations
ranging from the macro level study in this report to the environment around a single
acquisition. Recommend the Value Net or a similar analysis tool be added to the training
regime for DoD personnel.
C. SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES
This study provides only the basic level of strategic intent on the part of the key
players in the defense industry. It does not fully discern the potential for foreclosure or
the use of other anti-competitive tactics. Additionally, this study only looked at half of
the network centric warfare picture. DoD is undergoing a revolution of business affairs.
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Perform a trend analysis on the prime contractor's value added
performance to detect the growth and shrinkage of market share for
specific mission functions.
2. Plot the network centric linkages for the Revolution of Business Affairs
and build a value net analysis of the key industry players involved in the
sparing, distribution, contractor logistic support, base support programs.
Then use the study to determine any strategic trends affecting the
support of the revolution in business affairs.
3. Perform a study to determine the key overlaps between network centric
warfare and network centric logistics and determine the implications for
the prime contractors that support the overlap functions
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